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Rosoff and Orlando: Employers and Health Insurance Under the Affordable Care Act

Employers and Health Insurance Under
the Affordable Care Act
Arnold J. Rosoff* & Anthony W. Orlando**
The healthcare system of the United States has historically stood apart

from the systems of other major nations in two very important respects.
First, as has been widely noted and often decried, we are the only major
nation that has not committed to Universal Health Care ("UHC").' Second,
and closely related, our system is built on a foundation of voluntary
employment-based health insurance ("EBHI"). meaning most people in the
U.S. who have health insurance obtain it through their employer or the
employer of a member of their household. The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (herein "the ACA" or the colloquial "Obamacare") 3
has undertaken to move us toward UHC-i.e., adequate health insurance
coverage for all citizens-and has provisions that could substantially
change the employment-based nature of our health insurance system.
This paper offers an evolutionary view of our employment-based system:
how we came to have the current system, how the ACA changes things, and
how employers and others are likely to respond to the ACA and other
factors at play in our nation's contemporary economic and social
environment with regard to EBHI. Section I reviews the history of health
insurance in the U.S., emphasizing how our system came to be so heavily
based on voluntary employer action. Section II assesses the consequences
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1.
Bruce Vladeck, Universal Heath Insurance in the United States: Reflections on the
Past, the Present,and the Future, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 16, 16-19 (2003).
2.
As of May 2014, 55 percent of firms offer health benefits to their workers, and 90
percent of workers are in a firm that offers health benefits to at least some of its employees.
THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 2014 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY 8, available cit
http://kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2014-summary-of-findings/.
3.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 141
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C).
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of placing EBHI at the center of our nation's healthcare system. Section III
examines how the ACA undertakes to change the EBHI environment, and
howy the Obama Administration, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS") and
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (4HHS" ) are
implementing the relevant provisions. Section IV attempts to project how
employers will respond to these changes, and how the U.S. healthcare
system will evolve as a result. This prognostication is very difficult because
of the diversity and complexity of the factors bearing on this evolution.
Consequently, the paper's contribution lies not in offering a definitive
conclusion and prediction but, rather, in setting out an analytical framework
by which readers can better understand what may happen over the next
decade and beyond. Section V summarizes the above and sets forth the
authors' overall conclusions.
I.

THE HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT-BASED COVERAGE IN THE U.S.

The United States was not the first country to build a health insurance
system on a foundation of employer responsibility. That distinction belongs
to Germany, where workers in the mid- I800s pooled their resources to pay
the healthcare expenses of workers who got sick or injured and had been
regularly paying their monthly contribution to the cooperative. 4 In an
attempt to counter the vorking class's attraction to the trendy allure of
communism, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck turned this ad hoc arrangement
into a national system with his Imperial Insurance Order, issued in 1883,
which required all workers and employers across the country to pay into
sickness funds. " '5 To this day, employment-based health care is widely
knowxn as the "Bismarck model."6
The United States started from a similar grassroots premise, but moved
in a more voluntary, incentive-based direction. First came the institution of
health insurance itself. In 1929, Baylor University Hospital began offering

4.
See Anne Underwood, Health Care Abroad: Germany, N.Y. TMIES (Sept. 29, 2009),
http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/29/health-care-abroad-germany/ (chronicling
the history of Germany's employment-based health insurance system.) Today, Germany's
"sickness funds", as these cooperatives came to be called, are financed through a payroll tax
levied on employers and employees. Albert DiPierro, Universal Problenms & Universal
Healthcare:6 Countries- 6 SAstems, OR. FUTURE, 31 (2004), available at http://
libmedia.willamette.edu/xmluibitstream/handle/10177/4551/countries healthcare27.pdf?sequence=1.
5. Underwood, stqpra note 4: accord Soc. SEC. ADMIN., Otto von Bismarck,
http://www.ssa.gov/history/ottob.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2015) (discussing Bismarck' s
influence on social insurance in Germany).
6. Lorraine S. Wallace, A View of Health Care Around the World, 11 ANNALS FAM.
MED. 84, 84 (2013): Olga Khazan, What American Healthcare Can Learn From Germany,
THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 8,2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/04/whatamerican-healthcare-can-learn-from-germany/360133/.
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local schoolteachers a prepaid plan of hospital and medical care in
exchange for a regular monthly payment. In 1932. the Balor
,as Plan-"
expanded to whole communities, allowing them to choose among multiple
hospitals.8 To distinguish these plans from other emerging health insurance
arrangements, hospitals and other healthcare providers began using blue
crosses or blue shields as brand logos. 9 These "Blue Cross" (hospital
service) and "Blue Shield" (medical care) plans, colloquially termed "The
Blues." grewv during the Great Depression through state-by-state adoption
of enabling statutes that gave special concessions-typically in the form of
tax exemptions-to nonprofit plans that sold insurance on a 1communitv-

rated" basis.' 0
A.

World War II and the Postwar Years: Employers Take the Lead

Labor strife in the early years of the Great Depression spurred a
tremendous push for unionization, which led to the passage of the National
Labor Relations Act (the Wagner Act, or "NLRA") in 1935. securing the
right of workers to unionize and bargain collectively." Under the NLRA,
unionization continued apace through the latter half of the 1930s. 2 By the

7.
See David J. Ballard et al., Health Care Qualin "hIqnrovelnentAcross the Baylor
Health Care System: The First Century., 17 BAYLOR U. MED. CTR.PROC. 277, 279 (2004)

(stating that the vice president of Baylor University proposed that Dallas school teachers
contribute 50 cents a month to guarantee them up to 21 days of hospital care in a semiprivate room): see also CAROL F. O'NEILL, AM. C. OF MED. PRAC. EXECUTIVES, How DD WE
GET HERE? A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2006),
available cit https://hcahomework.files.wordpress.com/2008/03/how-did-we-get-here-ahistorical-review-of-payment-systems-in-the-us.pdf.
8.
Ballard et al., supra note 7,at 279.
9.
Marc Lichtenstein, Health Insurancefron Invention to Innovation: A Histor " of the
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Companies, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD, http://
www.bcbs.com/blog/health-insurance.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2015).
10. D. ANDREW AUSTIN & THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE
MARKET STRUCTURE OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY 3 (2009), availableat https://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40834.pdf: Melissa Thomasson, Health Insurance in the United
States, EH.NET, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/health-insurance-in-the-united-states/ (last visited
Apr. 27, 2015): STEPHANIE KELTON, CENTER FOR FULL EMP. AND PRICE STABILITY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE HEALTH CARE CRISIS IN AMERICA: HOW DID WE GET HERE? 14-15
(2007), available cit http://www.cfeps.org/%5C/health/chapters/pdf/Chapter%201% 20
Introduction.pdf. Under "community rating," insurers put all insureds into a common risk
pool, disregarding differences in individual or work-group risk characteristics. Since
insurance relies on "the law of large numbers" to damp out fluctuations and yield a more
predictable and stable risk and premium structure, community rating, the pooling
arrangement closest to social insurance, is the ultimate mechanism for dealing with societal
risks.
11.
See generally National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-169 (West,
WestlawNext through P.L. 113-294, excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-283, 113-287, 113-291).
12.
See Claude Fischer, Labors Laboring Effort, BERKELEY BLOG (Sept. 9,2010),
http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2010/09/09/laborE2%80%99s-laboring-effort (indicating that
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time the U.S. wvas draxwn into World War II ("WWII"), unions had a high
penetration into the national workforce. 3 When a wartime anti-inflation
presidential Executive Order froze wages, 14 the unions had to come up with
something else to push for their workers or union membership would
plummet. 15 While it blocked wage increases, the law allowed unions to
negotiate for fringe benefits, such as pensions and health insurance, and the
unions largely focused on the latter.16 Given the labor shortages of the War
years, employers responded to the unions' pressure by offering health
benefits, and competition among employers for the scarce labor supply
fueled an escalation in those benefits over time.
By the end of WWII, the unions' push for health insurance wvas wxell17
embedded, as was the trend toward employers providing health benefits.
Employers, continuing their competition for manpower in the post-war
"boom" economy, used the strength and attractiveness of their health
insurance plans to recruit and retain employees.'8 In 1943, the IRS ruled
that employers could deduct the cost of health insurance as a business
expense but that employees (and their dependents) did not have to
recognize the monetary value of the health insurance benefits as income.19
This exemption from taxation meant that employer-provided health
insurance is purchased with before-tax dollars. If the employer did not
provide insurance, but simply paid the employee more, the employee would
have to pay tax on the additional income and then buy the insurance with
reduced, after-tax dollars.'0 In effect, the exemption amounts to a federal

unionization increased during the Great Depression, the New Deal Era, and the early postwar period).
13.
See id. (referencing the union density chart). In just one decade, from 1935 to 1945,
the percentage of employed workers belonging to a union more than tripled, from
approximately one-tenth to one-third of the U.S. workforce.
14.
Exec. Order No. 9328, 8 Fed. Reg. 4681 (1943).

15
Union members naturally lost a key incentive to pay dues when the union's primary
function-to negotiate for higher wages-was blocked.
16. David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers For Enmployment-Based Health
Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS 23, 25-26 (2002) (explaining that " [the
freezing of cash wages forced employers to compete for scarce labor by enhancing their
fringe benefit packages" and "[d]uring the late 1940s and 1950s, unions aggressively
bargained for richer benefit packages, with health insurance at the top of their list."). For
more on this excellent article and its authors, see notes 94-100 infra and accompanying text.
17.
Id. at 26.
18.
Id. at 25: Thomasson, supra note 10.
19.
Hyman & Hall, supra note 16, at 25.
20. See I.R.C. § 106 (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-294 (excluding P.L. 113235, 113-283, 113-787, 113-291)) (amended 2014 by P.L. 113-295, 128 Stat. 4010) ("Gross
income of an employee does not include employer-provided coverage under an accident or
health plan."): see also I.R.C. § 162(a) (allowing a deduction for "other compensation,"
which includes health expenditures furnished by employers).
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subsidy for the purchase of health insurance and was clearly intended to
incentivize such purchasei. Congress enshrined the employees' tax shelter
for employer-provided health benefits in the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, an approach that has persisted to the present day.- The tax shelter
was a substantial incentive and a major reason why the move toward EBHI
accelerated in postwar years.
B.

Health Care Costs Begin Their Rise

From its beginnings, health insurance in the United States developed
with little regard for cost-containment. Up to and through the 1960s, the
insurance system mostly paid for health services on a "fee-for-service"
("FFS") basis, giving physicians and hospitals an incentive to over-provide
or over-utilize expensive services and inflating the cost of health care.
Elsewhere, in countries such as the United Kingdom, the government
strictly regulated prices and/or utilization to contain these costs; but the
U.S. healthcare system developed without these cost controls . When
Congress created Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 to assure access to health
care for the elderly, disabled, and poor, political pressures dictated that
government payment for hospital and 2 medical
services would be provided
6
essentially on a "blank check" basis.' Under Medicare Part A, hospitals
were paid retroactively adjusted cost-based reimbursements-essentially
what it cost the provider to render the services, determined after the fact,'
21.

Note that, as discussed below, note 183 infra, that subsidy is greater-in absolute

dollar terms, at least-for higher-income employees, who are in a higher income tax bracket.
22.
See Hyman & Hall, supra note 16, at 25 ("Ten)ears later... Congress amended the
Internal Revenue Code in 1954 to expressly exclude employment-based coverage from

taxable income.").
23.
AuSTIN & HUNGERFORD, supra note 10,at 5: Thomasson, supra note 10: see also
Hyman & Hall supra note 16, at 25 CThe result is a substantial financial incentive for
employees to obtain coverage through their employer if at all possible."): see also KELTON,
supJra note 10,at 17 CThis preferential tax treatment for 'fringe' benefits gave business an
incentive to offer health insurance to their employees.").
24.
KELTON, stupra note 10, at 18. Under FFS, one unit of service - e.g., each day of
hospitalization or doctor office visit - earns the provider one unit of pay: thus the more

units rendered the greater the provider's income. The cost of health care is the product of the
number of units provided (the "utilization") times the price per unit.
25.

A single-payer health system with strong government controls does not, however,

assure that there will not be troublesome cost concerns. See, e.g., TONY WHITE, A GUIDE TO
THE NHS 74 (2010) (explaining that in 1948, England's government founded the National
Health Service Act, which established "a free, comprehensive healthcare service, available to
the entire population" and by 1953, the Guillebaud Committee Report "called for better
information and analytical services to resolve financial difficulties in the NHS").
26

For an excellent and comprehensive analysis of the political wrangling over

Medicare and the medical establishment's vigorous opposition, see
THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE, 2D ED. (Transaction Publishers, 2000).
27.

THEODORE MARMOR,

When cost-reimbursement is figured on a retroactively-adjusted basis, it removes
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plus a modest profit. a Under Part B, physicians were paid whatever was
"'usual. customary, and reasonable" ("UCR") in the geographic medical
community -that is. whatever the area's doctors customarily charged for a
particular service.29 Largely because of these policies and the FFS structure
of private insurance, overutilization led to rapid cost inflation. 0
Importantly, the separation of providers from payers meant that providers
could over-provide services and overcharge for services provided without
sufficient constraint from patients, who were insulated by their insurance
from the effects of the cost escalation. 3'
By the 1970s, employers and government officials alike were seeking
reforms to address the growing problem of healthcare cost escalation.'
Many policymakers, including President Richard Nixon, considered
creating a national health insurance system.33 However, by that time, the
employment-based system was deeply entrenched, with powerful
constituencies committed to maintaining it. 34 Corporate human resources

much of the incentive of the provider to try to live within its budget, since any additional
cost gets passed on the government.
28.
See SHANNON BROWNLEE, OVERTREATED: WHY Too MUCH MEDICINE IS MAKING Us
SICKER AND POORER 31-32 (2007). In the case of nonprofit hospitals the correct term would
be "'margin."
29.
Avik Roy, Saving Medicarefron Itself, 8 NAT. AFF. 35, 39 (2011), available at
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/saving-medicare-from-itself (last visited
Mar. 22, 2015): Thomasson, supra note 10: see also Thomas L. Greaney, Transforming
Medicare Through Physician Payment Reform: An Introduction to the Symposaium Issue, 34
ST.LouIs U. L.J. 749, 752-54 (1990) (discussing how reasonable cost was an accepted
principle from 1961 to 1965). The UCR fee screen system was also utilized by Medicaid and
other third party insurers. O'NEILL, supra note 7 at 10.
30.
See BROWNLEE, supra note 28, at 33 ("Every time individual physicians raised their
fees, Medicare and private insurers were forced to raise reimbursements, and soon physician
payments were in an inflationary spiral.").
31.
See Michael H. Bernstein & John T. Seybert, Everyone Pays the Price When
HealthcareProiders I azive
Patients ('o-Itsurance Obligations, 21 HEALTH L. 20, 24
(2008) (indicating how providers seek more treatment for a patient than necessary, focusing
on their personal profits and not necessarily the best interests of the patient). Patients often
have to pay deductibles and co-payments, which are supposed to induce cost-consciousness
on the consumer side as well as help to defray the cost of services: but it is generally
acknowledged that these patient payments do little to counter overutilization. Id.
32.
See KELTON, stpranote 10, at 19 ("Throughout the 1970s, sharp increases in
medical costs spawned various forms of legislation aimed at slowing the pace of health care
inflation. For example, in August 1971, President Nixon imposed wage and price controls in
an effort to contain inflationary pressures.").
33.
See MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE SHADOW WELFARE STATE: LABOR, BUSINESS, AND
THE POLITICS OF HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 68 (2000) (indicating that in 1971, the
Nixon administration proposed to establish an employer mandate which "would require
employers to pay 65 percent of the cost of insurance premiums for employees working 25
hours or more per week," but the proposal was met with strong opposition to what would
essentially establish a national health insurance system).
34.
Id.
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("FR") executives, for example, stood to lose much accumulated power,
and possibly their jobs, if there was a transition away from EBHI. In the
early postwar years, employers' provision of health insurance had been
simpler, with most employers choosing Blue Cross/Blue Shield Q"BC/BS")
coverage. Unlike "the Blues," which were limited by their enabling statutes,
for-profit insurers ("the commercials") could "experience-rate" their group
business." That is, they could assess the risk exposure of a given company
(or group of companies, such as an industry sector) and offer to that
company or group a lower premium reflecting its better health risk and
healthcare cost experience.3 6 The commercials sought out, aggressively
marketed to, and, with their lower premiums, successfully wooed away
companies with better risk exposure and cost statistics, leaving BC/BS
plans' community-rated risk pools with poorer risks and higher costs. 3 7 As
more and more companies with favorable risk characteristics migrated away
from the community-rated pools, the quality of those pools decreased and
their premiums increased, prompting a further migration. Significantly
disadvantaged by the competition from experience-rated group insurance,
the Blues campaigned for and eventually won, on a state-by-state basis, the
right to experience-rate their group insurance business.3 8 As community
rating gave way to experience rating across the nation, the era of early
idealism in private insurance had ended. The natural tendency for
companies (and people generally) to pursue their own self-interest at the
expense of the interest of the larger collective is, on a broader scale, as good
an explanation as one can give for our country's long-term inability to

35. CONSUMERS UNION, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD A HISTORICAL COMPILATION 5-6
(2007), available at http://consumersunion.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/yourhealthdollar
.org blue-cross-history-compilation.pdf (citing ROBERT CUNNINGHAM III AND ROBERT M.
CUNNINGHAM JR., THE BLUES: HISTORY OF THE BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD SYSTEM, (1997),

and defining experience rating as "the practice of setting insurance premiums on the basis of
the actual loss experience of a given employee group," as distinct from community rating,
which is the "concept of creating rates for a large pool of subscribers").
36.
See Jessica L. Roberts, "Healthism ": A Critique of the Antidiscrimmlzation Approach
to Health Insurance and Health-CareReform, 2012 U. ILL. L. REv. 1159, 1168-69 (2012)

(defining experience rating as examining "the actual claims histories of the individual
groups" and then using that information to calculate future risk and make a premium
adjustment based on the claims history).
37. See id. at 1170 (discussing how group and individual markets are disadvantaged by
health insurance practices that cause individuals with chronic health conditions to increase
their out-of-pocket expenses by 70 percent). See also NYS Health Maint. Org. Conference.
v. Curiale, 64 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that the disintegration of nonprofit
insurance organizations is due to the experience rating utilized by commercial insurers to
price insurance premiums, leaving nonprofit insurers with the sickest members of the
population and very few healthy subscribers to offset the costs).
38.
Katherine Pratt, Funding Health Care with an Enployer Mandate: Efficiency and
Equit- Concerns, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 155, 205 (1994).
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achieve Universal Health Care.
As time went on and the insurance market became more diverse and
competitive, employers, especially the larger companies, developed HR
staffs with specialists who were better at shopping for coverage and
negotiating with insurers.3 9 These company experts had a stake in
maintaining the system they knew. They campaigned for EBHI in part
because they believed in it but also, one may assume, because their job
security was tied to it. The largest companies had the biggest stake in the
employment-based system because - under "experience rating" - they had
more stable risk pools and the most market clout and therefore could secure
and offer the best health benefits to recruit the best employees, giving them
a competitive advantage in the labor market.40 Such companies, of course,
also had the most influence in lobbying Congress, influence they used to
maintain the status quo, the EBHI system.4'
C.

Late Twentieth Century: The Managed Care Movement

Employers were not entirely comfortable with the status quo, however,
because healthcare costs continued to rise annually, usually at a rate higher
than costs in general. - Reflecting the cost concerns of many American
businesses, General Motors complained that it spent more for health care
than it did for steel. 43 Healthcare costs were increasingly seen as a factor
jeopardizing American companies' global competitive position, a problem

39.
David Blumenthal, Enpzloyer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States
Origins and Iinplications,355(1) N. ENG. J. MED 82, 83-85 (2006), availableat http://
people.umass.edu/econ340/nejm-ebhi.pdf.
40.
See John R. Graham, T1ly Do Employers fl-ant to Control Their Employees 'Health
Benefits ?,NATIONAL CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS - HEALTH POLICY BLOG (Sep. 15, 2014),
available tit
http://healthblog.ncpa.org/why-do-large-employers-want-to-control-theiremployees-health-benefits/.
41.
See NAT'L BUS. COAL. ON HEALTH, EMPLOYERS COMMIT TO STATUS Quo FOR
HEALTH BENEFITS, OFFER CLEAR REJECTION OF PRIVATE EXCHANGES: RESULTS FROM THE
2014 INSDE BENEFITS COMMUNICATION SURVEY (2014), available tit
http://

www.nbch.org/nbch/files/ccLibraryFies/Filename/000000003480/IBCSurvey%20one%2p
age%20report.pdf (stating that despite health care reform, HR and benefits practitioners
intend to maintain the status quo).
42.
See Michelle Andrews, Health Premniumns and Costs Set to Rise for Workers
Covered tit
Work, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 14,2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2014/
10/14/356097499/health-premiums-and-costs-set-to-rise-for-workers-covered-at-work

("[E]mployers say they're making changes to their health plans in 2015 to rein in cost
growth: 68 percent said they plan to do so in 2015, compared with 55 percent just two years
earlier.").
43.
Ali Frick, G.I CEO: Serious Health CareReform 'Lndoubtedly Ifould Help Level
the PlayingField',THINKPROGRESS Dec. 5,2008, http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2008/
12/05/33286/gm-health-care-reform/.
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that had to be corrected.
Consequently, employers supported the
managed care" movement-a complex of reforms intended to restrain cost
inflation while preserving the EBHI system.45
A foundational element of the managed care movement was the Health
Maintenance Organization ("HMO"). 4 6 HMOs provided a comprehensive
set of health services to a defined subscriber population for a predetermined
amount, transferring to providers the risks of overutilization and excessive
costs. 47 In theory, and generally in practice as well, the HMO model
brought the delivery of care and the payment for care together, presumably
inducing a desirable cost-consciousness in all parties involved. 48 The
paradigmatic HMO was the nonprofit prepaid group practice Q"PPGP")
model, best represented by the Kaiser Health Plans; 49 but in broader sweep
the HMO movement took in a variety of models in which the providers
were mostly paid a predetermined amount and had to provide all needed
care within this fixed budget.50
The managed care movement came into public prominence in 1970 with

the issuance of the -HMO White Paper" by the Department of Health.
Education, and Welfare CHEW"). 5' It was further propelled by the passage

44.
Expert Guidance: Implications of The Changing Nature Of Society, HUM.
RESOURCES COMPLIANCE LIBR. (CCH) 54,062 (West 2013).
45.
See generally, Ronald Lagoe, Deborah L. Aspling and Gert P. Westert, Current and
Future Developments in Managed Care in the United States and Implications for Europe,
HEALTH RES. POL'Y & SYS. 1,2 (Mar. 17, 2005), available cit http://www.health-policysystems.com/content/3/1/4 (discussing the history of managed care in the United States).
46.
The term "Health Maintenance Organization" and the acronym HMO were coined
by Dr. Paul M. Ellwood, Jr., whose healthcare think tank, Interstudy, championed the
concept and worked with missionary zeal to promote the spread of HMOs. See Bradford H.
Gray, The Rise and Decline of the HMO: A Chcipter in U.S. Health-Policy -Histor', in
HISTORY

& HEALTH

POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: PUTTING THE PAST BACK IN

309, 316

(Rosemary A. Stevens et al. eds., 2006).
47.
Brian P. Battaglia, The Shift Toward Managed Care and Energing Liability Clains
Arising from Utilization Managenentand Financial Incentive Arrangements Beni'een
Health Care Providers and Payers, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 155, 174-75 (1997): see
generally Gray, supra note 46.
48.
See Gray, supra note 46, at 318-22 (discussing the history of HMOs).
49.
Id.at 318-19.
50.
See Arnold J. Rosoff, Phase Two of the Federal HMO Development Program: New
Directions After a Shi c" Start, 1 AM. J.L. & MED. 209, 210 (1975) (discussing alternative
types of HMOs, including "open panel" or "foundation-type" plans). In 1979 HEW was
reorganized and became today's HHS (Department of Health and Human Services).
http://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/UnitedStates-Department of HealthEducation, and W
elfare.
51.
See id.at 210-214 (discussing the efforts HEW made to promote HMOs,
referencing the prediction in their White Paper that by 1980 there would be 1,700 HMOs in
operation and discussing the progress of the HMO movement after HEW made this
prediction).
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of the federal Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 5 2 which
offered federal funds for feasibility studies, HMO development costs, and
5
initial operating expenses>.
The law was intended to have a nationwide
network of HMOs in place by 1980 that would afford ninety percent of
Americans the option of getting their health care through an HMO.54 Not
only did HMOs' early penetration into the health insurance market fail to
meet these projections, but HMOs' promised economies failed to
materialize. In fact, the managed care movement generally did not deliver
on its initial hype, and public enthusiasm for it waned.55 Managed care is
still a significant part of the U.S. healthcare scene today but has proved no
panacea. Complex problems of cost, access, and quality of care still remain.
D. The Current Predicament:
Employers FindNew Ways to Avoid Rising Costs
Going into the decade of the 1970s, despite the best efforts of insurers

52.

Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914-36

(1973): see Rosoff suJpra note 50,at 214 (explaining the passage of the HMO Act).
53.
See Soc. SEC. ADMIN., NOTES AND BRIEF REPORTS: HEALTH MAINTENANCE
ORGANIZATION ACT OF 1973 37 (1974), availableat http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/

v37n3/v37n3p35.pdf. The Act authorized $375 million for a five-year period in grants and
contracts for "(1) surveys or other activities to determine the feasibility of developing and
operating or expanding the operation of an HMO, (2) planning projects to establish HMO's
or to expand the membership of an HMO or the area that it serves, and (3) projects to
initially develop HMO's.'"
54. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH
POLICY FOR THE 1970's: A WHITE PAPER 37 (1971), availableat https://
ia601006.us.archive.org/7/items/towards comprehen0Ounit/towardscomprehen00unit.pdf. A
key part of the legislative scheme was the so-called "Dual Choice" mandate, which required
employers of 25 or more employees who provided health insurance coverage to offer their
employees at least one federally qualified HMO plan in addition to whatever traditional
insurance coverage was offered. Rosoff supra note 50, at 229. One effect, then, of the HMO
movement in the 1970s was to require employer companies to have more knowledgeable HR
staff to administer their health benefits. See Blumenthal, stpa note 1. The HMO Act fell far
short of its goal for penetration by 1980, but HMO development and growth continued
through the 1980s and HMOs, both non-profit and for-profit, have become a common part of
the U.S. healthcare landscape. See "A Quarter Century of Health Maintenance," 280 (24)
J.A.M.A 2059 (Dec. 23/30, 1998), availableat http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.
aspx?articleid=188296.
55.
See, e.g., Robert J. Blendon, Mollyann Brodie, John M. Benson, Drew E.Altman,
Larry Levitt, Tina Hoff and Larry Hugick, Understanding the Managed Care Backlash, 17(4)
Health Aff. 80-94 (1998). A widely noted reflection of the American public's disaffection
with HMOs' attempts at economizing on health care is the classic scene in the 1997 movie
As Good as ItGets in which Helen Hunt rails against the refusal of her HMO to cover
needed health care. See https://www.google.com/#q=as+good+as+it+gets+hmo+quote and
http://movie-sounds.org/comedy-movie-sounds/as-good-as-it-gets- 1997/fucking-hmobastard-pieces-of-shit.
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and employers alike, costs continued to rise,56 and still a large segment of
the U.S. population was uninsured or underinsured. Senator Edward
("Ted") Kennedy, who was widely expected to be the Democratic nominee
for president in 1972, made UHC a central plank of his platform and
strongly advocated adoption of a single-payer national health insurance
("NHI") system. 8 The Nixon Administration countered in 1971 with a
pluralistic, market-based NHI plan built on the existing framework of
private insurance and EBHI.5 9 Kennedy did not become the Democrats'
1972 presidential candidate. Nixon's NHI proposal went noxhere, 6 0 and
health care costs continued to rise.
Some larger employers, those who had a large enough number of
employees to constitute a sufficiently balanced risk pool, moved to selfinsurance. 6 1 With the assistance of a strong in-house HR staff or good
outside support, such employers could run their own health insurance
program at a lower cost. 62 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act

56.
See Christina H. Park, Prevalenceof Enmployer Self-Insured Health Benefits:
Nationaland State Variation,57 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 340, 341 (2000) (discussing selfinsurance as a way to combat the soaring cost of health care throughout the 1970s and
1980s).
57.
See Robin A. Cohen et al., Health Insurance Coverage Trends, 1959-2007:
Estinatesfron the NationalHealth Interview Survey, 17 NATIONAL HEALTH STATISTICS
REPORTS (2009).
58.
See Congressional Quarterly, Health Insurance: Hearings on New Proposals,27
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC, 92ND CONGRESS 1ST SESSION 541-544 (saying
Kennedy proposed the Kennedy-Griffiths bill in Jan. 1971).
59.
Nixon's Comprehensive Health Insurance Plan (CHIP) was drafted and circulated
as a proposal from 1971 on but was not formally introduced before Congress until February
6, 1974. See President Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress Proposing a
Comprehensive Health Insurance Plan (transcript available at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4337). See also STUART ALTMAN & DAVID
SHACTMAN, POWER, POLITICS AND UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE: THE INSIDE STORY OF A
CENTURY-LONG BATTLE 42 (2011): Nixon insisted on an employer mandate under which
employers would purchase health insurance coverage for their employees from private
insurers: however, Kennedy was unwilling to support this and the proposal failed. Id. at 55.
See also Michael Meyer, Nixon and the PPA CA, 22 ANNALS OF HEALTH L ADVANCE
DIRECTIVE

33, 37 (2012).

60
Note, however, that the basic architecture of the Nixon proposal, maintaining EBHI
and achieving UHC through employer-provided coverage, private insurance, and managed
competition carried forward as a foundational part of the ACA. See, .e.g., Robert Reich,
"Nixon Proposed Today's Affordable Care Act" (2013), http://www.salong.com/2013/10/29/
nixon-proposed-todays-affordable care act-partner/: see also, http://www.forbes.com/
sites/peterubel/2014/02/04/another-early-obamacare-supporter-richard-nixon/.
61.
See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Mark A. Hall, Self-Insurance for Small Enployers
under the Affordable Care Act: Federaland State Regulatory Options, 68 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 539, 540 (2013) (stating that, generally, self-insured plans are found among
large employers, since small groups are less capable of bearing risks associated with selfinsured plans).
62.
They still used health insurers to handle claims on an -administrative services only"
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of 1974 ("ERISA") provided further impetus for self-insurance by shielding
employee benefit plans from state insurance regulations, such as those
mandating certain costly benefits.63 However, there were so many factors
and forces causing healthcare cost increases that, even for self-insured
companies, costs continued to rise, increasing employers' incentive and
desire to get out from under the growing burden.64
With managed care and self-insurance not getting the cost-containment
job done, some employers began to back away from the EBHI system they
had long supported and defended. Starting in the 1980s, a significant
proportion of employers began raising the employees' share of the cost
through higher co-payments and less generous cost-participation formulas.65

("ASO") basis. Id. at 546. These insurers were known as "third-party administrators"
V"TPAs"). See id. at 557-58 (discussing how "North Carolina prohibits insurers from serving
as third-party administrators for small employers."). Sometimes insurers also provided backup insurance ("stop-loss reinsurance"). See Park, siqura note 56, at 354 (explaining that
"stop-loss coverage" helps employer's minimize risk): see also Jost & Hall, supra note 61, at
546 (comparing self-insured plans with "stop-loss" coverage to insured plans).
63.
Employee Retirement Income Security Program, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1974):
Park, siqura note 56, at 341. Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, states are
empowered to regulate "'the business of insurance." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1011 (West 2014).
However, ERISA preempts most state-level laws and regulations mandating inclusion of
benefits, such as mental health and alcohol and drug abuse treatments, which are expensive
and particularly problematic with regard to utilization control. Park, supra note 56, at 341,
346.
64. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., Enployer-SponsoredFamily Health PremiuamsRise a
Modest 4 Percentin 2013, NationalBenchimark Eiployer Survey Finds (Aug. 20, 2013),

http://kff.org/private-insurance/press-release/employer-sponsored-family-health-premiumsrise-a-modest-4-percent-in-2013-national-benchmark-employer-survey-finds/. Self-insurance
also created a conflict of interest by putting the employer in a middleman position between
its employees, to whom the employer owed a duty to negotiate for the best quality
treatments, and the insurer, with whom it was trying to bargain for lower costs. See Christine
Eibner, et al., TECHNICAL REPORT: EMPLOYER SELF-INSURANCE DECISIONS AND THE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AS MODIFIED BY THE

HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010 (ACA), 1(2) RAND HEALTH
QTLY (Summer 2011) 29-30, availablecit HTTP://WWW.RAND.ORG/PUBS/PERIODICALS/
HEALTH-QUARTERLY/ISSUES/V1/N2/07.HTML (discussing the potential conflict of interest
between employers and employees during claims adjudication): see also U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON A STUDY OF
THE LARGE GROUP MARKET 6 (2011), available cit http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/

LGMStudy.pdf.
65.
See generally, Timothy Jost, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMERDRIVEN MOVEMENT 67 (2007). Historically, it was common for employers to have "defined
benefit" health plans, in which the covered benefits were defined and whatever it cost to
provide that package of benefits was divided between the employer and the employee, often
on an 80/20 basis. If the insurance premium for the covered benefit package rose by $100,
the employer would bear $80 of that increase. Some companies began putting dollar limits,
or caps, on the amount of the increase they would bear, saying, for example, that regardless
of how much the premium increased for the following year the employer would only cover a
given amount, say $60, of the increase. An increasingly common arrangement is for an
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Many companies that previously provided coverage to employees' families,
regardless of the number of dependents, started charging an additional
premium to cover family members. 66 Other companies adopted wellness
programs, designed to decrease healthcare costs by improving the health of
their employees.6 These programs, while commendable in their intent, fell
short of delivering proven benefits in terms both of health outcomes and
cost savings.68 In short, employers increasingly sought ways to get out from
under the burden they had taken on themselves and were increasingly
frustrated by their inability to do so.
During the years when EBHI was on the rise, employers were loath to
skimp on healthcare benefits for fear of losing valuable workers to a strong
labor market in which they could easily be lured away by a competitor with
a better health plan. Nowadays, with weakened labor power, an evolving
labor market, 69 and the threat of global outsourcing, the positions are
reversed: employees are wary of asking for too much. With more workers
looking for a job, employers no longer need to offer the most lavish
benefits. If they continue to offer good healthcare coverage, it is most likely
because of inertial forces. The managerial class may be satisfied with the
status quo, for example, and employers may be reluctant to upset their
settled expectations. Perhaps not yet a complete anachronism, the
employment-based system for providing health insurance is on uncertain
ground. This brings us to the big question: In today's xorld, do the benefits
of EBHI outweigh the costs? The next section addresses that question:

employer to offer a "defined contribution" plan, whereby the employer says how much it
will contribute for the employee in a given period and the employee must bear whatever
cost, and cost increase, goes beyond the employer's contribution. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES,
ISSUE BRIEF: UNDERSTANDING DEFINED CONTRIBUTION HEALTH PLANS (2002), http://
www.actuary.org/files/dc-june02.4.pdf/dc-juneO2.4.pdf.
66.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2014 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
1 (2014) available at http://files.kff.org/attachment/ehbs-2014-abstract-summary-of-findings
(discussing how employers charge higher premiums for family coverage).
67.
See SOEREN MATTKE ET AL., WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS STUDY, RAND
HEALTH 1-2 (2013), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsalpdf/workplacewellnessstudyfinal
.pdf (discussing that employers have started wellness programs to combat chronic disease).
68.
See Austin Frakt & Aaron E. Carroll, Do Workplace Wellness ProgramsWork?

Usually Not,N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/12/upshot/doworkplace-wellness-programs-work-usually-not.html (explaining why workplace wellness
programs usually do not work): but see MATTKE ET AL., supra note 67, at xiii (explaining

that these programs have been found to impact employees' "long-term health trajectory").
69. In this evolving labor market, jobs have become less secure and careers more
volatile. The political scientist Jacob S. Hacker has famously termed this transformation

"The Great Risk Shift." In such a constantly changing environment, companies are less
likely to make efforts and expenditures to tie employees to them for the long term. See
JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND THE
DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM
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focusing for the most part on the contributions of EBHI in the pre-ACA
world. How the ACA changes things and might affect this analysis will be
dealt with in Section III.
II.

PROS AND CONS OF THE EMPLOYMENT-BASED SYSTEM

While many, including the authors, believe that EBHI is not the best
foundation for our nation's healthcare system, it has served a valuable
function throughout much of the twentieth century and, even in today's
changed and changing world, it may still make sense to continue its use in
selected applications.70 A key point to remember is that in designing a
system for the U.S., we are not starting with a clean sheet of paper. What
we have in place now, and the commitment of people and institutions to
maintaining the status quo, are powerful determinants of what we can hope
to achieve as we seek the ideal solution.
Key hallmarks of an employment-based system, at least as it has evolved
in our country, are diversity, complexity, and cost. Almost by definition, an
employment-based system is decentralized, depending on many employers
to negotiate with many insurers, who in turn must negotiate with many
hospitals, physicians, and other providers of healthcare goods and
services.7 1 The result is a myriad of insurance products, prices, and
relationships that in its diversity and complexity goes well beyond what
exists anywhere else in the world. 7 2- It is uniquely "American." The case
against EBHI is not open-and-shut, however; and, even if it were clear-cut
in substantive terms, it would still be a daunting challenge to change settled
thinking and move toward new structures and arrangements. Just as large
ships can't turn in their own length, decentralized social systems don't
change overnight, or even in a decade.

70.
This is the view of David Hyman and Mark Hall, whose excellent article, Two
Cheersfor Enzployment-Based Health Insurance, supra note 16, was an important guide
through this analysis.
71.
See Uwe. E. Reinhardt, Einplo"ment-BasedHealth Insurance: A Balance Sheet, 18
HEALTH AFF. 124, 126 (1999), availabletit
https://www3.nd.edu/-wevansl/class-papers/
reinhardt employer health insurance _health-affairs.pdf (explaining the decentralization of
the employment-based system). Note that one can posit a national healthcare system that
relies heavily on employer initiatives, actions and financing and yet is much more tightly
constrained in its structure and operation than ours is. Germany, Argentina and Japan offer
good examples. See generally T. R. RED,THE HEALING OF AMERICA: A GLOBAL QUEST FOR
BETTER, CHEAPER, AND FAIRER HEALTH CARE (2010).
72. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Report of the Working

Group on Challenges to the

Employment-Based Healthcare System (Nov. 14,2001), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/

publications/AC 1114bO 1 report.html ( [A] large employer can wield clout in the market
place by virtue of the sheer number of employees and hence the dollars it brings to the
insurer ....
Employers can demand things from the insurer that individual buyers could
not.").
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The Presumed Benefits of Choice

Americans are accustomed to an environment that offers unparalleled
choice in all aspects of their consuming behavior. Although it lacks a
Constitutional basis, we tend to regard freedom of consumer choice as a
right, much like freedom of speech or the right to own a gun. We love
choice and believe in it deeply. Considered from the viewpoint of
neoclassical economics, an abundance of choices is highly positive. In
theory, having many competitors vie to provide the best quality goods and
services at the lowest cost in order to win the business of the most
consumers is a key strength of our economy and an assurance of the
public's satisfaction. In the healthcare context, howvever, the benefits of
choice are harder to realize. Consumers rarely have the knowledge, ability,
time, or patience to fully explore and understand all their options and make
an optimal decision. Thus, in health care, as in some other technical areas,
an overabundance of choice and the complexity it introduces can lessen
consumers' ability to make good choices and to engage the force of
competition to constrain price inflation.
There is also a significant transaction cost to offering consumers
alternatives and bringing those alternatives to their attention. As an
example, compare the "medical loss ratio" of Medicare with that of private
insurance, meaning how much of each dollar goes to running the insurance
plan as opposed to providing care. Medicare generally operates at a loss
ratio of approximately 97%; that is, roughly 97 cents of every Medicare
dollar go to pay providers for care and only about 3 cents are used for
administrative costs of the program. Historically, the loss ratios of private
insurance plans have been much lower, in the range of 68-88% for
individual coverage, somewhat higher but still below 90% for group
coverage. 74 There are many reasons for the higher administrative expenses

73.
SUSAN M. FINLEY, THE GREAT AMERICAN RIP-OFF: A CONSUMER'S PERSPECTIVE ON
HEALTHCARE 25 (2007). Psychological studies have shown that having too many choices can
lead to confusion and stress, potentially causing consumers to make worse decisions than
they would have made in a more restricted setting. See, e.g., BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE
PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS 3 (2005), ..
there is a cost to having an overload
of choice.").
74.
See, e.g., Health Affairs, Health Policy Brief on Medical Loss Ratios (Nov. 17,
2010), availableat http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.phpbrief-id=31
(last visited Apr. 27, 2015). The ACA, attempting to assure that insurance purchasers get
good value for their money, imposes minimum loss ratios on insurers. Insurers of individuals
and small (less than 100) groups must maintain a loss ratio of at least 80%, while insurers of
larger groups must have a loss ratio of 85% or more. Id. See also http://
www.cms .gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-Insurance-Market-Reforms/MedicalLoss-Ratio.html. While the medical loss ratio is widely used as a metric to assess the
efficiency and value of a health insurer's plans, this complex measure must be used carefully
to avoid drawing invalid conclusions about a plan's worth. See James C. Robinson, Use and
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of private insurance, but one of the principal factors is how much it costs to
offer consumers a wide range of choices. If there were good evidence that
allowing such a range of choice paid off in terms of better competition,
greater consumer satisfaction, etc., the higher cost would be worth it; but
such evidence is lacking, so the American public's addiction to free choice
must be seriously questioned.
B. Does EBHIAssure Choice?
Critics of the ACA, and of government intervention in the healthcare
sector generally, emphasize the benefits of choice and complain about how
the law limits free choice; but EBHI does not assure-or even supportconsumer choice to the extent that many assume. In the pre-ACA world,
employers were free to choose what health coverage, if any, to provide their
employees. Some companies used that freedom of choice knowledgeably

and benevolently for the employees' welfare, but choice at the corporate
level does not equate to choice at the level of the individual employee.
While some employers, especially larger ones, may offer their employees a
range of health benefit options-often termed a "cafeteria plan"-others
make a company-wide selection of a single health plan and the employees'
only "choice" is to take or leave it. The chosen plan may be ideal for some
of the company's employees and not so good for others;,6 thus, the systemic
choice offered by EBHI on the macro (healthcare system or company/firm)
level may be a mere illusion of choice on the micro (individual insured)
level.
Moreover, EBHI may interfere with job choice in the labor market. The
variability in health plans from one employer to another makes it difficult to

Abuse of the Medical Loss Ratio to Measure Health Plan Performance, 16(4) HEALTH
AFFAIRS 176-187 (July-Aug. 1997), availabletit http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/
16/4/176.full.pdf.
75.
To explain just one dimension of this, consider the marketing costs involved when
an employer seeks or accepts bids from several insurance companies. Each company must
employ salespeople to market its product(s) to the employer. The sales costs necessarily add
to the price of the insurance. If the employer offers several different insurers' policies, each
insurer must also sell at the individual employee level, with the costs of brochures, websites,
call-center operators, etc., again adding to the price of the coverage. At the corporate level,
the insurer's activity is termed -marketing": at the individual level it is called "enrollment."
Both levels of activity generate significant cost, which raises the price of the product.
76.
A company that offers a very generous health insurance, for example, may be
serving well the interests of its middle-aged, high-tax-bracket managerial class who like and
can afford "gold" coverage, while a healthy young assembly-line employee might find that
level of coverage to be overkill. He or she might be better served by a less expensive, less
generous "bronze" level plan and more dollars in the pay envelope. Yet, if the company
follows a "one size fits all" health benefits policy, the "choice" that the employer enjoys at
the corporate level is no choice at all for the young employee.
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compare employment opportunities when one is looking for a job or
thinking about changing jobs. The specifics and richness of the insurance
benefit is much harder to assess than salary levels or other terms and
conditions of employment. A job-seeker who tries to use health coverage as
a factor in deciding which job to take or keep is likely to be confounded by
the many variables in health plan details. Many of these details are not
transparent to prospective employees-or even to current employees, for
that matter. It's not just the policy language that varies but also howy the
insurer interprets and applies that language in practice, something that
insurance shoppers find very difficult, if not impossible, to assess before the
fact. As will be discussed in the following section, one of the advantages
the ACA offers is the establishment of the Insurance Exchanges, which are
rationalized and standardized retail markets designed to facilitate
comparison-shopping.
Prior to the ACA's guarantees of coverage and insurability, 77 employees
were often reluctant to change jobs, even when that was the right thing to
do on other grounds, because they did not want to disrupt their insurance
coverage. 7 ' Even if the new employer provided a good insurance package,
the employees, or their dependents, might be subject to exclusions of preexisting health conditions and/or a waiting period for full vesting of
benefits. This phenomenon of sticking with one's current job for fear of the
side-effects of making a switch, known as job lock," takes awvav an
important dimension of personal choice and interferes with the dynamic
functioning of the labor market, wxhich compromises the nation's economic
strength.

77.
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg, various subsections (2010) (sub. 3,prohibiting pre-existing
condition exclusions: sub. 4., prohibiting discrimination based on health status: sub. 6,

mandating coverage of "essential health benefits": and sub. 7,prohibiting excessive waiting
periods before coverage begins).
78.
The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA"), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168, tried to ameliorate this problem by facilitating bridge coverage for
workers transitioning from one job to another, but it relied on the very expensive individual
market, which is unaffordable for many, if not most, consumers. See Michelle Andrews, For
Workers Leaving Their Jobs, Health Exchanges Offer Insurance Choices beyond COBRA,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 16, 2013), http://khn.org/news/091713-michelle-andrews-

cobra-and-health-exchanges/ (discussing COBRA as a "transitional type of coverage").
79.
See Anna Sanz-de-Galdeano, Job-Lock andPubhc PolicY: Clinton s Second
Mandate, 59 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 430,430 (2006) (identifying some situations in which
job-lock may arise, e.g., if a person has a preexisting health condition). Job lock may be a
positive feature for employers who use health benefits to recruit and retain employees,
although this approach is less likely to work in a world of labor scarcity. See David S.
Caroline, Comment, Emtployer Health-CareMandates: The Wrong Answer to the Wrong
Question, 11 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 427, 435 (2009) ("An individual who needs better insurance
might change jobs, even if he or she otherwise is quite content and productive, which in turn

causes an unnecessary loss in efficiency."). In today's world, where the "surplus army of the
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The complexity and diversity of the EBHI system, with its multitude of
different plans, providers, and payment regimes, doesn't just affect
insurance purchase choices and the dynamics of the labor market; it can
also affect the delivery and quality of health care. 0 For patients, it can
result in less continuity and coordination of care than patients enjoy in some
other countries. 8' That lack of coordination is linked to higher rates of
medical errors, greater rates of infection during hospital stays, and lower
quality of care generally. 8' For physicians, it results in more paperwork and
payment headaches than doctors face in other developed nations.83 For
insurers, it results in significantly higher administrative costs than public
insurance systems. That doesn't necessarily mean. however, that insurers
would rather be part of a public system. Lower efficiency and higher cost
aren't necessarily bad if you're on the receiving end of the84cost chain. One

man's expense is another's revenue and, sometimes, profit.

unemployed" is so large and capital so much more powerful than labor, it seems unlikely
that many employers would need health benefits to recruit and retain employees. See
ANTHONY W. ORLANDO, LETTER TO THE ONE PERCENT 43-44 (2013) (referencing Karl
Marx's phrase "surplus army of the unemployed" and reminding that when "unemployment
is high, workers are negotiating from a weak position.").
80. The negative effects of discontinuous and uncoordinated health care can be found in
any type of health system, not just an employment-based one, but these two elements are so
tightly interwoven in the United States that it is impossible to keep their effects strictly
separate.
81.
See Cathy Schoen et al., New 2011 Survey of Patientswith Comqlex Care Needs In
Eleven Countries Finds That Care isOften Poorly Coordinated,30 HEALTH AFF. 1,1-3

(2011) (referring to chart comparing coordination of care in eleven countries and stating how
in the United States -89 percent of total national health spending is concentrated on the
sickest 30 percent of the population. Because these patients typically see multiple clinicians
at different locations, care coordination is imperative. Without effective communication
among providers, these patients are at risk for experiencing delays, errors, and ineffective
care.").
82. See Elizabeth Docteur & Robert A. Berenson, How Does the Quality of U.S. Health
Care Comipare Internationally?Timely Analysis of hImediate Health Policy Issues, URBAN

8 (2009), available tit
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411947_ushealthcare_
quality.pdf (stating that patients in the U.S. may be at a greater risk of safety problems such
as medical error).
INST.

83.
See Cathy Schoen et al., Access, AffordabilitA, and Insurance Comlplexit " Are Often
Worse in the United States Coiparedto Ten Other Countries, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1,8 (2013)

CThe United States also stood out in the 2012 survey of physicians in 11 countries for timeconsuming insurance-related complexity. Fifty-four percent of US primary care physicians
said that the amount of time that they and their staff spent dealing with coverage restrictions
was a 'major problem. a significantly higher percentage than that in any other country.")
Surely, though, some U.S. physicians would rather deal with a complex and fragmented
system than one with tighter governmental controls. If this weren't so it's much more likely
that the U.S. would have a governmental system. From the beginning in this country, what
doctors want, or are comfortable with, has been a key determinant of the architecture of our
healthcare system.
84.

See Diane Archer, Medicare IsMore Efficient Than Private Intsurance, HEALTH
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This imbalance of negotiating power plagues not only insurers in
negotiating with hospitals and physicians over reimbursement rates, 85 but
also consumers in negotiating with insurers. 86 In public insurance systems,
the government generally has significant negotiating power as the
representative for most, if not all, of the country's health insurance
customers. In some cases it has the legal authority to set prices without
negotiation. 87 While large employers in the U.S. may have and exercise
significant bargaining power when dealing with insurers and health plans,
certainly much more than small businesses do, they are clearly at a
disadvantage in negotiating for lower insurance premiums and better
coverage when compared with their counterparts abroad, who essentially
outsource such negotiations to the government. 88 This difference in
bargaining power is an important reason why both employers and
employees in the U.S. face significantly higher costs for health care 89
Matters are even worse for individuals who attempt to purchase health

(Sept. 20, 2011), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2011/09/20/medicare-is-moreefficient-than-private-insurance/?view=full (explaining that Medicare is more efficient than
private insurance and has less administrative cost).
85.
Hospitals often have a geographic monopoly, forcing insurers to pay the rates they
demand if they want to insure patients in that locality. See Avik Roy, HospitalMonopolies:
The Biggest Driver of Health Costs That Nobody Talks About, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2011),
available tit http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2011/08/22/hospital-monopoliesthe-biggest-driver-of-health-costs-that-nobody-talks-about/.
86.
See Christopher M. Pope, Legislating Low Prices: Cutting Costs or Care?
BACKGROUNDER1, 2-3 (Heritage Found. No. 2834, Aug. 9, 2013), available cit http://
thf-media.s3.amazonaws.com/2013/pdf/bg2834.pdf (explaining how the monopoly hospitals
have over the health care system leads to higher costs for consumers).
87.
Id. Japan is one such country where the government sets standardized fees for
physician fees and other cost elements. See, e.g., Naoki Ikegami, Japanese Health Care:
Low Cost Through Regulated Fees, 10 HEALTH AFFAIRS 87-109 (Fall 1991). See also Naoki
Ikegami & Gerard Anderson, In Japan,All-Paver Rate Setting Under Tight Government
ControlHas Proved to Be an Effective Approach to Containing Costs, 31 HEALTH AFFAIRS
1049-1056 (May 2012): See also Pope, supra note 86 at 5-8.
88. See, e.g., ALYSSA KIM SCHABLOSKI. HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS AROUND THE WORLD,
INSURE THE UNINSURED PROJECT 31 (2008), available tit http://www.itup.org/
Reports/Fresh%20Thinking/Health-Care-SystemsAroundWorld.pdf (providing that the
United Kingdom's central government sets health priorities under the National Health
Service Act of 1946 and controls the overall pool of funds). By contrast, in the U.S.,
employers must fend for themselves in their dealings with insurers. This particularly puts
small businesses at a disadvantage. Essentially, they must choose between insurance that is
less generous and higher priced than their larger competitors' insurance or no insurance at
all.
89.
See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Why Does U.S. Health Care Cost So Much? (PartII:
Indefensible Administrative Costs), N.Y. TIES (Nov. 21, 2008), http://
economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/21/why-does-us-health-care-cost-so-much-part-iiindefensible-administrative-costs/ (explaining why health care costs are high).
AFF. BLOG
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insurance in the non-group market. 90 They have negligible negotiating
power because they cannot pool their risks with others into a group that
insurers have to take together. 9' The result is - or, at least, was before the
ACA - that insurers underwrite and cherry-pick to get the best risks,
leaving consumers with health problems, those who need insurance most,
with the choice of paying exorbitant costs or going uninsured.> This has
been the most widely acknowledged shortcoming of our EBHI system-a
lack of access for millions of Americans, translating into an uninsured rate
that dwarfs all other developed nations combined. 93 Section III below
examines how the ACA attempts to address these issues, but they remain
the primary challenges of a private, employment-based system.
Despite its limitations and failings, the EBHI system in the U.S. has
made a profound contribution. In the absence of a comprehensive national
health insurance system, employer-provided insurance has made a generally
good level of coverage available to a substantial majority of our citizens,
and has funded the development of a highly sophisticated and successful
healthcare system. In a world where private insurers can pick and choose
which persons to insure, based in significant part on their personal and
family health history, current health status, and anticipated future healthcare
needs, many more Americans would be without adequate coverage if it
weren't for EBHI.94 Employers can pool risks, covering both the healthier
and the less healthy within their employee "families" and creating
something akin to a community rating system in which the low-risk
insureds help to subsidize the needs of higher-risk consumers. 95 For these
reasons. EBHI deserves "two cheers" (not the full three), as Professors
David Hyman96 and Mark Hall,9 two of the most knowledgeable and

90.
See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 72 (noting that an employer has more leverage
than an individual when it comes to negotiating discounts on premiums).
91.
Il.
92.
But see David Blumenthal, The Three R s ofHealth hIsurance,COMMONWEALTH
FUND (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publicationsiblog/2014/mar/thethree-rs-of-health-insurance (explaining how risk adjustment under the ACA attempts to
deter insurance plans from cherry-picking enrollees while at the same time protecting
companies that attract sicker-than-average customers): ExplainingHealth Care Reform: Risk
Adjustment, Reinsurance, and Risk Corridors,KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1 (Jan. 22, 2014),
http://kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/explaining-health-care-reform-risk-adjustmentreinsurance-and-risk-corridors/ (discussing how insurers are no longer allowed to deny
insurance or charge higher premiums for people with pre-existing conditions).
93.
See Health at a Glance 2013: OECD Indicators,OECD 138 (2013), http://
www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/Health-at-a-Glance-2013.pdf (discussing coverage and
costs of health care for other countries).
94.
Hyman & Hall, supra note 16, at 32.
95.
Id.
96.
David A. Hyman, M.D., J.D., is Professor of Law and Medicine at the Univ. of
Illinois, where he directs the Epstein Program in Health Law and Policy. See https://
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perceptive scholars in this field, proclaim in their thorough and insightful
2002 article chronicling the history of EBHI and critically evaluating it. 98
Because of its failings and the possibility of reforming our nation's
healthcare system to assure adequate coverage for all without the
discriminatory practices of a free-market private insurance market, Hyman
and Hall reserve their "third cheer." The Affordable Care Act affords a
solution to the main problems that EBHI evolved to address, 99 and upon
successful implementation of the ACA's insurance exchanges, should offer
the freedom of choice and the benefits of free-market competition that
EBHI was intended to deliver but never quite did. For this reason the third
cheer for EBHI may never come. 00 To explore that possibility, the next
section considers how the ACA has changed the environment in which
EBHI exists and operates.' 0'

III.

HOW THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT CHANGES THE GAME

The ACA's approach to EBHL like so many parts of the Act, is the
product of political compromise. In the debates preceding the ACA's
passage, many UHC advocates and various stakeholders favored a national
healthcare system that was not employment-based. 10 2 However, both
politically and practically it was not feasible to toss out the existing system
and replace it with something else.0 3 A "clean slate" approach simply was
not feasible; a large segment of the public had a strong commitment to the
existing EBHI system. For this reason, EBHI was retained as a foundational
element of the ACA, at least on an optional basis. 104

www.law.illinois.edu/faculty/profile/davidhyman.
97.
Mark Hall, J.D., is Professor of Law at Wake Forest Univ. School of Law and

directs the University's Center for Bioethics, Health & Society. See http://
law.wfu.edu/faculty/profile/hallma/bio/.

98. Hyman and Hall, supra note 16, at 24.
99.
Id.at 32.
100. Id.at 32-33.
101.
Patricia C. Flynn, Health-CareReform and ESL Reconsidering the Relationship
Betieen Emiployment and Health Insurance, 115 Bus. & Soc'y REv. 311, 313 (2010)
(discussing how EBHI began during World War 11 and how federal policies helped to
expand this coverage).
102. See, e.g., Ronald Bailey, Ending Emiployment-based Health Insurance Isa Good
Idea But Do We Really Need a New Regressive Health Insurance Tax?, REASON (October
16, 2007), available at http://reason.com/archives/2007/10/16/ending-employment-basedhealth-i. See also Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Problem with Tax-Exemipt Health Insurance, N.Y.
TBIES (October 10,2008), http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/10/the-problemwith-tax-exempt-health-insurance/.

103. See Hyman & Hall, supra note 16, at 35-38 (discussing problems that could occur
with reform and a shift away from EBHI).
104. See Angie Drobnic Holan, Obama Statements on Single-PaverHave Changeda
Bit, POLITIFACT (July 16, 2009, 3:39 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/
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Campaigning for the ACA's passage, President Obama stated on several
occasions that Americans who were satisfied with their healthcare plans
would be able to keep their current plans. 10 5 In broad concept, that may
have been the ACA's objective; but it's not easy to make major changes to
a highly complex, deeply embedded system and still keep wholly intact a
key element of it. 10 6 The President undoubtedly regrets making this
"promise" without the necessary qualifiers, 10 7 but the underlying rationale
made sense: keep what is good and valued in the system, strengthen it
where necessary, and build in options for alternatives. This section explores
how the ACA accomplishes these goals, starting with an overview of a key
concern with free-market insurance systems, "Adverse Selection".
A.

The Adverse Selection Problem

For the ACA's promise of universal coverage to be attainable and
sustainable, the whole population must be enrolled in the system because of
the perils of "adverse selection," an economic phenomenon xell knoxwn in
the insurance industry.'0 8 If people are allowed to choose whether to
participate in a risk pooling arrangement, the ones who know or believe
themselves to be at low risk will opt out and withhold their premiums,
leaving the risk pool overpopulated with the poorer health risks who will
require more care and, thus, drive up the cost of the insurance.' 0 9 To make

statements/2009/j ul/1 6/barack-obamalobama-statements-single-payer-have-changed-bit/
("Obama says he supports the idea of universal health care but does not think a single-payer

government system is feasible ... He has said he is reluctant to switch to a 'single-payer'
national health insurance system because of the difficulty in making a quick transition from
the employment-based private system.").
105.
See, e.g., Obama: 'If You Like Your Health Care Plan, lou 71 Be Able to Keep
Your Health Care Plan', POLITIFACT, http://www.politifact.com/obama-like-health-carekeep/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2015): see also Washington Free Beacon, 36 Tinies ObaliaSaid
You Could Keep Your Health Care Plan, YouTUBE (Nov. 5, 2013), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=qpa-5JdCnmo (compiling 36 times that President Obama stated

"if you like your health care plan, you can keep your health care plan").
106. The story behind why Obama and other Administration spokespeople made this
claim so strongly and unequivocally, without the limitations, caveats, and qualifiers needed
to make it fully accurate is interesting and bears importantly on the question of the future of
employment-based health care. However, it is too lengthy and complex to be adequately
covered here. For a fuller explication, see Matthew O'Brien, Everything You Need to Know
About Obama "sNeu 'You Can Keep Your Plan 'Pohcv, ATLANTIC (Nov. 16, 2013), http://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/11/everything-you-need-to-know-aboutobamas-new-you-can-keep-your-plan-policy/281522/.
107. Ashley Killough, ObainaApologizes for Insurance Cancellationsdie to
Obainacare,CNN (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/07/politics/obamaobamacare-apology/.
108. Mark Pauly & Sean Nicholson, Adverse Consequences of Adverse Selection, 24 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 921 (1999).
109.
Hyman & Hall, supra note 16, at 31-32.
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matters worse, as this causes insurance premiums to rise, reflecting the
deteriorating quality of the risk pool, the higher cost will drive the next tier
of relatively good risks out of the risk pool. This step-wise degradation of
the pool makes it less and less viable. L0 If the risk mix gets bad enough the
pool goes into what some term a "death spiral."' l Insurers can protect
themselves from this situation if allowved to "undenrwrite" applicants
_ i.e.,
initially exclude those who are poor risks, limit their benefits, and/or charge
them higher premiums - or to drop people from coverage when they prove
themselves to need too much care. Historically, U.S. health insurers,
operating in a free-market regime, have been able to manage their risk
exposure this way, in some cases cherry-picking" only the very best risks;
and they have done so, yielding an unfortunate segment of the population
who, prior to the ACA, either could not get coverage or had to pay
excessively high premiums. "' In the interest of achieving universal
coverage and assuring non-discrimination, the ACA guarantees insurability
by forbidding insurers to exclude those with pre-existing health conditions,
impose waiting periods before such conditions become covered, raise
premiums on those who turn out to be poor risks, and drop such insured
individuals from coverage.'14 Given these "patient protections," it is
essential that the entire population be covered all of the time. If they were
not, prospective insureds could stay out of the risk pool until they needed
care and then come forward and demand their guaranteed insurability. That
would be tantamount to requiring fire insurance companies to issue policies
to homeowners when they come running in shouting that their houses are
ablaze." 5
To assuage the opposition of health insurers to the above-mentioned
patient protections" and to combat adverse selection, which would
otherwise expose insurers to its destructive effects, the ACA contains both

110.

BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ & ANNIE L. MACH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,

R42663,

HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE

ACT (ACA) 24 (2013), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42663.pdf.

111.
Yuval Levin, An Insurance Death Spiral?, NAT'L REVIEW, THE CORNER (Oct. 25,
2013), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/362215/insurance-death-spiral-yuval-levin
(explaining that a "death spiral" is a progressively deteriorating risk pool that has gotten so
bad that it's no longer sustainable).
112.
See Larry Levitt & Gary Claxton, Isa Death Spiral Inevitable if There isNo
Mandate ?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 19, 2012), http://kff.org/health-reform/perspective/isa-death-spiral-inevitable-if-there-is-no-mandate/.
113.
Leigh Page, T17i 'Ch7erry-Picking Patientsis Gaming Ground,MEDSCAPE (Dec.
19, 2013), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/818079.
114.
42 U.S.C.A.§§ 300gg-3-7 (West, WestlawNext current through P.L. 113-296
(excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-287, 113-291, and 113-295))(2010).
115.
See Levitt, sitqra note 112.
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individual 1 6 and employer mandates.17 The "Individual Shared
Responsibility' provision requires individuals to have coverage that
provides at least the "minimum essential coverage" the ACA prescribes.
and imposes a tax penalty if they do not." 8 Likewise, employers of fifty or
more full-time equivalent ("FTE") employees must provide coverage that
meets the law's requirements or pay a penalty, which the ACA
119
euphemistically terms an Emplover Shared Responsibility ("ESR") fee."
These penalties are meant to induce individuals and employers to do the
right thing and, to a limited extent, to provide funds to the government to
help defray the additional expenses it will incur providing needed care to
uninsured or underinsured individuals. '20 However, the penalties are set
well below the cost of the insurance that the mandate requires.'"21 Thus, in
many cases, it would cost less for an employer to violate the mandate and
pay the penalty than to comply with it. '22 This statement, however, takes
account only of the dollars directly expended under each alternative; it
doesn't consider what might be very substantial costs in terms of employer-

116.
26 U.S.C.A. §5000A (West, WestlawNext current through P.L. 113-296
(excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-287, 113-291, and 113-295)) (2010): see IndividualShared
Responsibility Provision Minimum Essential Coverage, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/Affordable-Care-Act/Individuals-and-Families/ACA-Individual-SharedResponsibility-Provision-Minimum-Essential-Coverage (last updated Mar. 13, 2015).
117.
26 U.S.C.A. §4980H (West, WestlawNext current through P.L 113-296
(excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-287, 113-291, and 113-295)) (2010): see Ellployer Shared
Responsibility Provisions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Affordable-CareAct/Employers/Employer-Shared-Responsibility-Provisions (last updated Feb. 18, 2015).
Note that although both the individual and employer responsibility provisions are widely
referred to as "mandates," as reflected in many of the articles hereinafter cited, the ACA
does not use that word and the law's requirements are structured so as to not be absolutely
prescriptive. Therefore, as explained below, it would be more precise to speak of the
provisions as strong incentives rather than "mandates." See generally Fitzgerald, note 121
infra.
118. 26 U.S.C.A. §5000A (2010). See Annie L. Mach, INDIVIDUAL MANDATE UNDER
ACA (Cong. Research Service Report R41331, Aug. 12, 2014) available at https://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41331.pdf. The penalty starts low but increases between 2014
and 2016 and is indexed to inflation thereafter. Id.at 1-4.
119.
En;ployerMandate, U.S. CHAMBER OF CoM., https://www.uschamber.com/healthreform/employer-mandate (last visited Mar. 19, 2015).
120.
Bob Semro, The Role of the 'EmploverHandate in the Affordable Care Act,
HuFFPOsT DENVER (July 12, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bob-semro/the-role-ofthe-employer-mandate b 3575041.html.
121.
See Beth Fitzgerald, Einployers Could Opt to Pay A CA Penalty Rather than
ProvideMandated Coverage, NJBIZ (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.njbiz.com/
article/20141126/NJBIZO1/141129821/Employers-could-opt-to-pay-ACA-penalty-ratherthan-provide-mandated-coverage: See a/lso
CIGNA, EMPLOYER MANDATE FACT SHEET 3
(2014), available at http://www.cigna.com/assets/docs/about-cigna/informed-on-reform/
employer-mandate-fact-sheet.pdf (listing the penalties applied to employers).
122.
Fitzgerald, siqura note 121.
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employee relations, a company's public image, its ability to attract and
retain employees, and other non-quantifiable side effects of a decision to
violate the mandate. As discussed in Section IV below, the considerations
and calculations needed to decide what is the best course are complex and

can var depending on an individual's or employer's particular situation.
B. Employer SharedResponsibilitv
A full exposition of the employer mandate and its many details is beyond
this paper's scope; it is sufficient for present purposes simply to understand
the basics. The ACA defines FTE employees as those who work thirty
hours or more per week 123 and applies the mandate basically to those
employers who have fifty or more FTEs. 124 It defines "'minimum essential
coverage" of health insurance in terms of what is covered, guarantees of
insurability and maintenance of coverage, and criteria of premium equity
and affordability.' 12 The ESR provisions require employers to provide at
least 95% of their employees with this minimum insurance and contribute at
least 60% to its cost. 12 6 The insurance must cover the employee and any
dependents under the age of twenty-six, not including the employee's
127
spouse.
Employers are treated differently depending on their size, as measured

123.
26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H.
124.
Id.Opponents of the ACA intent on limiting its reach have proposed amending the
law to define FTE employees as those who work 40 or more hours per week and to apply the
mandate only to larger employers. See Paul N. Van de Water, Health Reform Not Causing
Significant Shift to Part-Time Work, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, http://
www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa-view&id=4028 (Jan. 6,2015) (last visited June 22, 2015).
125.
26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West, Westlaw through P.L 113-296 (excluding P.L. 113235, 113-287 and 113-291) approved Dec. 19, 2014). See generally, IndividualShared
Responsibility Provision - Minimum EssentialCoverage, supra note 116 (detailing the
requirements for minimum essential coverage).
126.
26 C.F.R. § 54.4980H-4 (West, Westlaw through Apr. 23, 2015) C"[for purposes
of this paragraph (a), an applicable large employer member is treated as offering such
coverage to its full-time employees (and their dependents) for a calendar month, if for that
month, it offers such coverage to all but five percent (or, if greater, five) of its full-time
employees ....
"):See also Questions and Answers on Enployer SharedResponsibility
Provisionsunder the Affordable CareAct, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/
Affordable-Care-Act/Employers/Questions-and-Answers-on-Employer-SharedResponsibility-Provisions-Under-the-Affordable-Care-Act (last updated Feb. 18, 2015)
[hereinafter Questions andAnswers]: see also CIGNA, supra note 121, at 1-2.
127.
See 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-296 (excluding 113235, 113-287, and 113-291) approved Dec. 19, 2014) (requiring dependents, not including
spouses, to be included in coverage. The ACA assumes that spouses will obtain insurance
either through their employer or by purchasing it on an exchange): 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-14
(West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-296, excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-287, 113-291),
approved Dec. 19, 2014) (extending coverage for dependents until they attain the age of 26).
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principally by their number of employees. 18 Their responsibilities under the
ACA vary substantially and the requirements applicable to them now are set
to begin at different times.''29 In 2015, the mandate applies only to firms
with 100 or more FTEs; starting in 2016 it applies as well to firms with fifty
to ninety-nine employees. 30 Smaller firms are eligible for tax credits to
encourage and enable them to provide insurance."'3 The size of the firm and
the wage levels of its employees also affect the penalties for non-

compliance. 13
As noted above, the ACA doesn't speak of employer payments as a
penalty; rather, it uses the less provocative term -ESR fee"."' For
employers subject to the mandate, the fee is $2,000 per employee per year,
calculated and prorated on a monthly basis. 1 4 Thus, if an employer of 100
or more employees chooses not to provide its employees with insurance in
2015, and if at least one of those employees shops on an insurance
exchange and is eligible for a federal premium subsidy, the employer would
normally have to pay through the IRS a $2,000 ESR fee for each of its 100
employees-$200,000 in aggregate. The ACA's phase-in provisions will
soften the impact somewhat through 2016 by granting exemptions for some
number of an employer's employees, but the rules regarding the exemptions
vary by year and company size and are complicated to compute, putting an
unappealing administrative burden on employers. 115

128.
Juliet Eilperin & Amy Goldstein, White House DelaAs Health Insurance Mandate
for Mediun-size Etnployers Until 2016, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2014), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/nationalihealth-science/white-house-delays-health-insurancemandate-for-medium-sized-employers-until-2016/2014/02/10/ade6b344-9279-1 1e3-84e127626c5ef5fb-story.html. The wage levels of the employees are also taken into account in
calculating the employer's obligations and available subsidies. See CIGNA, supra note 121, at
1-2.
129.
Eilperin & Goldstein, supra note 128.
130.
CIGNA, supra note 121, at 1: Eilperin & Goldstein, stqura note 128. Starting in
2016, large employers will be considered those with an average of 50 or more employees,
while small employers will be those with less than 50 employees. Id.
131.
26 U.S.C.A. § 45R (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-296 (excluding P.L. 113235, 113-287, 113-291) approved Dec. 19, 2014): 26 C.F.R. §1.45R-3 (West, Westlaw
through Apr. 23, 2015): 26 C.F.R. §1.45R-5 (West, Westlaw through Apr. 23, 2015): see
also Small Business Health Care Tax Creditfor Small Enplovers, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV.http://www.irs.gov/uac/Small-Business-Health-Care-Tax-Credit-for-Small-Employers
(last updated May 24, 2015). Small firms are defined not just on the number of employees
but also on the employees' average earnings. See id.
132.
See 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-296 (excluding 113235, 113-287, and 113-291) approved Dec. 19, 2014).
133.
Id.
134.
Id.
135.
Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 29,
8576 (Feb. 12, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1,54 & 301): see 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H
(West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-296 (excluding 113-235, 113-287, and 113-291) approved
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The process steps and calculations an employer must engage in to assure
it is meeting its ACA obligations are very onerous; many, especially those
responsible for compliance, have bemoaned their complexity. 13 6 Surely, this
has an effect on employers' reaction to the ACA and their decision process
about how to deal with it. Figuring out the optimum approach for dealing
with the ACA's requirements is (a) very complicated, (b) subject to widely
varying interpretations, thus controversial, and (c) uneven, and perhaps
inequitable, in its application to different stakeholders. Given all of this, it is
no surprise that the ACA has been so controversial that it is impossible to
make confident predictions as to what will happen going forward.
C. How Essential is the Employer Mandate?
As discussed above, a core tenet of the ACA was to build upon the
existing healthcare financing structure, including EBHI. The law was
designed to motivate employers who do not currently provide insurance to
do what the substantial majority of U.S. employers were already doing,
while imposing on all employers coverage and affordability requirements to
assure that the insurance provided is adequate in terms of coverage and
affordability to the insured individuals. 3 7 The so-called employer

Dec. 19, 2014) (after 2015, large employers have an exemption for only 30 of those
employees): see also CIGNA, supra note 121. Thus, if the employer had 100 employees, its
ESR fee for 2015 would be $40,000 in aggregate or $2,000 for each of the remaining 20
employees. If the employer provided its employees ACA-qualifying insurance for 9 months
of 2015 it would owe the ESR fee for only 3 months, that is for 3/12 x $2,000 ($500) x 20
employees, or a total of $10,000. If that same employer provided coverage to its employees
and one or more of them purchased insurance on an exchange and got a federal subsidy, the
employer would owe an ESR fee that is the lesser of $2,000 for each of its employees (over

80 in 2015) or $3,000 for each employee whose employer's provided insurance did not meet
the ACA's minimum standards for coverage and affordability and who also received a
federal subsidy when purchasing insurance on an exchange. In 2015, the same 80-employee
exemption and per month proration would apply to this calculation: and the same question as
in note 136, infra, about which type of exchange the employee(s) purchased on would also
apply. In 2016 and thereafter, the exemption for a large (>99 employee) firm drops from 80
employees to 30 employees. See 26 U.S.C.A.§ 4980H (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113296 (excluding 113-235, 113-287, and 113-291) approved Dec. 19, 2014).
136. See Paul Demko, Compames Still Struggling to Comply with ,AC4
s Employer
Mandate, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20150120/BLOG/301209978/companies-still-struggling-to-comply-with-acas-employermandate: see also Lisa Chan & Joshua Schiefelbein, Obamacare's
Achilles Heel, U.S. NEws
(Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2014/03/10/theobamacare-mandate-is-still-bad-news-for-employers (last visited June 22, 2015).
137.

See Obainacareand You: If You Have Job-Based Coverage, KAISER FAM. FOUND.

(Oct. 2013), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/8495-obamacare-ifyou-have-job-based-cov-erage.pdf (The law encourages employers to offer health
insurance."): but see Suja Thomas & Peter Molk, Enployer Costs and Coflicts under the
Affordable CareAct, 99 CORNELL L. REv. 56,59-60 (2013) (arguing that the ACA

Published by LAW eCommons, 2015

27

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 24 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 5

Employers and Health Insurance Under the ACA

2015

"mandate" was not intended to be an absolute requirement"'38 if it were, the
penalties for non-compliance would be set considerably higher. Given the
flexibility and choice allowed, employers will have to think carefully and
make tough choices about how they will handle their newly imposed
responsibilities.
While allowing flexibility may have been the better thing to do
objectively-and was probably politically required to get the law passedthe many variables designed into the law to accommodate different
employers' particular situations and predilections make their decision
processes very complex. As with previous governmental regulatory
initiatives, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(-HIPAA"). 39 the ACA has spawned a whole industry of compliance
consultants and has required employers to choose among them, deal with
them, pay them, and in many cases adopt new policies and procedures to
accommodate the law. 140 Understandably, this has generated considerable
unhappiness and resistance in the business community.141 Some employers
are unhappy about what the law actually requires, some are unhappy about
what they misperceive the law requires, and some are unhappy because they
do not know or understand what the law requires and resent the effort and
expense needed to find out.142 Overhanging all of this is the general

inclination of American businesses to distrust government and resist

incentivizes employers to either minimize the number of employees who accept "adequate"
employer-sponsored coverage or to minimize the number of employees who obtain
individual subsidized coverage from an exchange as an altemative to "'inadequate"
employer-sponsored coverage).
138.
See Summzary of Coverage Provisionsin the PatientProtectionand Affordable
Care Act, KAISER FAm. FOUND. (July 17, 2012), http://kff.org/health-costs/issue-

brief/summary-of-coverage-provisions-in-the-patient/ (stating that there is no employer
mandate: however, there are penalties associated with failure to offer coverage).
139. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.): see also CHARLES R.
MCCONNELL, THE EFFECTWE HEALTH CARE SUPERVISOR 470 (Jones and Bartlett Publishers,
6th ed. 2007) (discussing how complicated HIPAA compliance is and how it affects
healthcare providers' feelings about governmental regulation).
140. See Japsen, infra note 151: see Demko, stpra note 136 (expressing the general
feeling that companies have of unpreparedness in the face of the requirement to comply with
the employer mandate).
141.

See The Enployer Mandate: Exanzining the Delay and ItsEffect on Workplaces,

(July 23, 2013), http://www.galen.org/topics/the-employer-mandate-examiningthe-delay-and-its-effect-on-workplaces/
Now, employers are more confused than ever
about their responsibilities and liabilities, including whether delay of the reporting
requirements does in fact also absolve them of the mandate itself.").
142. See Barack Obama "sMessage to Business: Stop I7uining, I >n Jour Friend,THE
ECONOMIST (Aug. 9,2014), http://www.economist.com/node/_1611140/print (addressing
Obama's awareness of the business community s "grumbling about the burden of
regulation" and complaints about "over-regulation").
GALEN INST.
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regulation. 143 Some employers will devote substantial attention and effort to
avoiding or minimizing compliance with the ACA's requirements, e.g., by
limiting the number of FTEs and cutting back on some employees' weekly
hours to avoid triggering more extensive requirements. 144 These attempts to
avoid or skirt the law are a big part of what opponents of the ACA have in
mind when they speak of the law as a job-killer."' 145 Although some would
disagree, there is nothing inherent in the ACA that makes it a job-killer or
would drag down the U.S. economy. Many other nations have UHC and
strong economies - Germany, for example - and the U.S. could achieve
this easily if it had the national consensus and will. Sadly, as President
Obama has observed,46it is difficult to make a major reform succeed when so
many want it to fail. 1
Whatever views parties at both ends of the political spectrum might have
had of the employer mandate, either in principle or with regard to practical
implications, another dimension has been added to the debate by the Obama
Administration's delay of the mandate's implementation. The ACA as
enacted called for the employer mandate to go into effect on January 1,
2014.147 However, because of the complexity of the employer provisions
and the business community's complaints that it could not gear up fast
enough to meet that deadline, the Administration announced in July 2013
that implementation would be delayed one year, until January 2015.148
Then, in February 2014, a further postponement was announced: the
requirements for companies with fewer than 100 employees were deferred
until January of 2016. 149 For companies with 100 or more FTEs, some

143.

See id.

144. See Chan & Schiefelbein, stqura note 136.
145. Glenn Kessler, Is Obamiacare a Job-Killer?, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2014), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2014/02/26/is-obamacare-a-job-killer/.
146.

Full Transcript:PresidentObamna Speaks Exclusively to George Stephanopollos

on 'This U eek, 'ABC NEWS (Sept. 15, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/09/
full-transcript-president-obamas-exclusive-interview-with-george-stephanopoulos/ See also
Deirdre Walsh, House Votes - Again - to Repeal Obanacare,CNN (Feb. 3, 2015), http://

www.cnn.com/2015/02/03/politics/obamacare-repeal-vote-house.
147. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-296 (excluding 113-235,
113-287, and 113-291) approved Dec. 19, 2014) (Amendments made by this section shall
apply to months beginning after December 31, 2013).
148.

See Valerie Jarrett, fIe r'e Listening to BusinessesAbout the Health Care Law,

WHITE HOUSE BLOC

(July 2, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/07/02/we-re-

listening-businesses-about-health-care-law ([P]ayments won't be collected for 2014."): See
also Mark Mazur, Continuing to Iinplement the ACA in a Carefl, Thoughtfil Manner, U.S.

DEPT.

OF TREASURY

(July 2, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Continuing-

to-Implement-the-ACA-in-a-Careful-Thoughtful-Manner-.aspx (Any employer shared
responsibility payments will not apply until 2015."): see also I.R.S. Notice 2013-45, 2013-31
I.R.B. 116 (providing transition relief for 2014).
149. Treast rv and IRS Issue FinalRegulations Iinplementing Enmployer Shared
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requirements were relaxed. 150 The business community's sighs of relief
were drowned out by angry shouts of ACA opponents who, instead of
applauding the Administration for its reasonableness and flexibility,
denounced it for high-handedly violating its duty by not implementing the
law as passed. 15 1 These critics claimed the Administration was playing a
political game, holding back the unpopular requirements until after the
November 2014 mid-term elections. 152 While political considerations may
have factored into the postponement, the Administration's decision to slow
employers'
implementation was likely driven mostly bv genuine regard for
difficulties. 153 Whatever the reasons for the delay, the effect is that, once

Responsibili " Under the Affordable CareAct for 2015, U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY (Feb. 2,
2014), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/j 12290.aspx [hereinafter
Treasury and IRS Issue FinalRegulations].
150.
See id.
151.
See Bruce Japsen, H17y ObamacareDelaV' Because Halfof Employers Are 't
Readyfor Rollout, FORBES (July 3,2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/
2013/07/03/obamacare-delay-until-2015-relief-for-half-of-employers/ ("Employers simply
were not ready."): see also Jackie Calmes & Robert Pear, PostponingHealth Rules
Emboldens Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2013, at A14, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/us/politics/postponing-health-rules-emboldens-republicans
.html?pagewanted=2 (referring to the delay as a "temporary reprieve" for U.S. companies):
Jonathan Adler, Was Delaying the EmnployerMandate Legal? Did the IRS Even Check?
WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2014) http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2014/03/22/was-delaying-the-employer-mandate-legal-did-the-irs-even-check/ (questioning
whether the Obama administration even had legal authority to justify waiving tax liability
and stating that the legal justification offered by the Treasury Department "has been
exceedingly weak").
152.
See Adler, supra note 151 (asserting that some argued the delay in the employer
mandate -conveniently pushed enforcement of the mandate beyond the 2014 election"): see
also Elise Viebeck, Sam Baker, & Amie Parnes, ObainacareEnployer Mandate Delayed
Until After 2014 Midterims, THE HILL (July 3,2013), http://thehill.com/policy/
healthcare/309003-obamacares-employer-mandate-delayed (recognizing the delay will be
implemented after the 2014 midterm elections): Calmes & Pear, supra note 151 ("Some
Republicans said the White House was trying to help Democrats by postponing the changes
until after the midterm elections, but others saw no gain for Democrats either way.").
153.
Surely the uproar over the botched roll-out of the Healthcare.govwebsite in
October of 2013 and other glitches in the ACA's implementation made the Administration
wary of opening another Pandora's box. See, e.g., David S. Joachim, Last-Day Rush Causes
Another Malfinction of Healthcare.gov,N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/us/healthcaregov-malfunctions-on-last-enrollment-day.html
(noting that the website unexpectedly ceased taking applications on the last open enrollment
day of the year): See also Joe Nocera, Obama 's Bay' of Pigs, N.Y. TvIES, Nov. 23, 2013, at
A23, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/opinion/nocera-obamas-bay-ofpigs.html?_r-0 (equating the roll out of Healthcare.gov to the Bay of Pigs invasion and a
"train wreck): see also Jennifer Haberkorn & Brett Norman, Probe Exposes Flaws Behind
Healthcare.govRollout, POLITICO (July 30, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/07/healthcaregov-probe-rollout-flaws-109546.html
(calling the rollout "disastrously flawed" and undertaken "without effective planning or
oversight practices").
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again, the ACA has generated controversy, hardened positions and made it
more difficult to project what will happen going forward. 5 4 It would be
hard enough to predict how employers will deal with the ACA if their
decisions were driven only by rational calculations about how best to
balance their legal obligations with their self-interest; but when pique and
politics enter the picture, prognostication becomes substantially more
difficult.1'
The future of the employer mandate is by no means clear. The
Administration has shown no eagerness to implement it and, as noted
earlier, might be just as happy to consign employment-based health
insurance to history. 5 6 As noted, opponents of the ACA decry the mandate
while at the same time also decrying the Administration's failure to
implement it more rapidly. 1 7 Many are still calling for the total repeal of
Obamacare,' 5 8 and while the increased Republican composition of the 1 1 4 th
Congress might seem to tilt the scales in favor of that, it is highly unlikely
that a repeal bill would ever make it to the President's desk. 5 9 where it
would most surely be met with a veto. That said, there are many on both
sides of the aisle who believe the ACA could use some revision. 160 The

154.
See Linda Feldmann, Has Obamia Abused Executive Power? His 5 Most
ControversialUses, The Christian Science Monitor (Aug. 1, 2014), http://
www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/DC-Decoder/2014/0801/Has-Obama-abused-executivepower-His-5-most-controversial-uses/The-Affordable-Care-Act-Employer-Mandate-Deay
(where the employer mandate delay is listed number-one on the list): see also Complaint,
U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell et al., No. 14-cv-01967 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2014),
Allegations 42-50, availableat http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/
HouseACAcomplaintI 12014.pdf.
155.
See Mary Mosquera, Delay in ACA En;ployerMandate Adds Uncertainty,
HEALTHCARE PAYER NEWS (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.healthcarepayemews.com/content/
delay-aca-employer-mandate-adds-uncertainty.
156.
See Holan, siqura note 104.
157.
See Walsh, supra note 146: see also Complaint, supra note 154. Republican
representatives have, in fact, sued the Administration over the delay of the employer
mandate.
158.
WASH. POST, TR4ASCRIPT: Sen. Ted Crtz 's marathon speech against
Obamiacare on Sept. 24 (Sep. 24, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2013/
09/25/transcript-sen-ted-cruzs-filibuster-against-obamacare/.
159.
See Jennifer Haberkorn, A GOP Senate Could Take on Obatiacare- But Not
Repeal It, POLITICO (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/2014-electionsgop-senate-obamacare- 1 10936.html CA Republican-controlled Senate cannot repeal
Obamacare, no matter how fervently GOP candidates pledge to do so on the campaign trail
this fall. But if they do win the majority, Senate Republicans can inflict deep and lasting
damage to the president's signature law.").
160.
See Paige Winfield Cunningham & Kyle Cheney, Why Liberals Are Abandoning
the ObamiacareEn;ployerMandate, POLITICO (July 6, 2014), http://www.politico.com/
story/2014/07/obamacare-employer-mandate-108578.html ([The employer mandate] cries
out for repair," and evaluating Republican and Democratic voices calling for revision of the
mandate.).
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House now has before it a proposal to change the definition of full-time
employment from thirty hours per week to forty hours to scale back the
reach of the mandate. 16 1 It is possible that sufficient bipartisan support
could emerge for dropping the employer mandate entirely.
As this article goes to press, the Supreme Court has just eliminated a
major threat to implementation of the ACA with its decision in King '.
Bttrwell. 16 2 In a 6-3 vote, the Court upheld the Obama Administration's
position that the ACA supports providing federal subsidies, in the form of
tax credits, to help qualified, lower-income individuals purchase insurance
on an ACA exchange whether the exchange is run by a state or the federal
government. 163 The Administration's position runs counter to language in
the Act which, if read literally and without due regard for the apparent
legislative intent to give federal assistance to all qualified citizens, could be
construed to restrict subsidies to only those who purchase on an exchange
1established bv (a) state."' 164 If the Supreme Court had accepted the
plaintiffs' position and denied subsidies to persons wvho purchased on
federal exchanges in the thirty-four states that had chosen not to set up their
own exchanges, a large percentage of the 6.4 million people who received
federal subsidies in connection with their purchases since January of 2014
may have been forced to drop out of the insured pool, possibly sending it
into a so-called "death spiral."' 65 Although further legal and political
challenges are still possible, it is wvidelv believed that the High Court's
latest "rescue" of the ACA effectively assures that it is here to stay. If the
insurance exchanges, be they state or federal, continue to function well-as,
thankfully, they seem to be now-it might be acceptable to drop the
employer mandate and let the natural process of attrition nibble away at
EBHI. How long that attrition might take is an important question
addressed in Section IV infra.
A May 2014 policy brief by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and
the Urban Institute ("RWJF-Urban") questions xhether the mandate is
needed, opining that eliminating the mandate will not decrease insurance
coverage significantly. 166 That prediction reflects the belief that many

161.
162.
(Decided
163.
164.

Save American Workers Act of 2015, H.R. 30, 114th Cong. (2015).
King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 576 U.S.
June 25, 2015) (No. 14-114).
Id.
Id. (Challengers of the law argue the text of the ACA only allows for state-run

exchanges, not federally-run exchanges "enrolled in through an Exchange established by the
State under 13 11.").
165. See notes 111-112 supra and accompanying text.
166. Linda J. Blumberg, John Holahan and Matthew Buettgens, Why Not Just Eliminate
the Et;ployer Mandate?,ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. & URBAN INST. (May 2014),
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413117-Why-Not-Just-Eliminate-the-
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employers will continue to provide insurance even without the mandate,
and people who do lose employer-provided coverage will either be covered
by the Medicaid expansion or will purchase
coverage on the insurance
67
exchanges assisted by federal subsidies.
A key problem, though, is that expansion of Medicaid and the federal
subsidies for individually purchased insurance will inevitably increase the
portion of the nation's healthcare bill that is carried on the federal budget.
168
Employer provision of insurance keeps much of that cost "off-budget."'
The RWJF-Urban report projects that eliminating the mandate could add
some $46 billion to the federal cost between 2014 and 2023.169 The
Congressional Budget Office estimates the same figure at $130 billion,
almost three times as much. 17 While some in Congress-mostly
Republicans-might like the employer mandate to go away, they surely
would not be pleased to see the cost burden transferred to the federal
budget. Given that, the success of an amendment to do away with the
employer mandate while keeping the rest of the ACA intact is highly
questionable.
IV.

WHAT WLL EMPLOYERS

Do?

The principal objective of this paper's evolutionary analysis is to try to
project what role employment-based health insurance will play in the future
of our nation's healthcare system. Some believe that role wvill be quite
limited. A very vocal and visible commentator on the point is Dr. Ezekiel
Emanuel, one of the architects of the ACA, who has predicted that 80
percent of U.S. employers will stop providing health insurance by 2025.171

Employer-Mandate.pdf.
167.
Id. at 3.
168.
The calculation is complex because the tax shelter that employees currently get for
the value of employer-provided insurance is, in effect, a federal subsidy. Thus if employees
move from employer-provided insurance to exchange-purchased insurance they are trading
one federal subsidy for another. Only some who purchase insurance on an exchange will
qualify for federal subsidies. By contrast, all who get their coverage through their employers
enjoy a federal subsidy in the form of the tax shelter, but that subsidy is very slight in the
case of low-income (and thus low-tax-bracket) employees. See Blumberg, supra note 166, at
4. The Congressional Budget Office and the Joint Committee on Taxation have attempted to
model the net effect of these competing forces. See, e.g. CBO andJCT'sEstnmates of the
Effects of the Affordable Care Act on the Number of People Obtaining Enqloyment-Based
Health Insurance, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE 3 (Mar. 2012), http://www.cbo.gov/

sites/default/files/03-15-ACA and Insurance_2.pdf.
169. Blumberg et al., supra note 166, at 4.
170. Id.
171.

EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL, REINVENTING AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: HOW THE

AFFORDABLE CARE ACT WILL IMPROVE OUR TERRIBLY COMPLEX, BLATANTLY UNJUST,

319 (2014): See
Sandy Fitzgerald, ObamacareArchitect Emanuel: Most Emnployers Will Drop Health
OUTRAGEOUSLY EXPENSIVE, GROSSLY INEFFICIENT, ERROR PRONE SYSTEM
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Others, such as David Hyman and Mark Hall, previously mentioned, have a
more positive view of EBHI and could see it continuing to play a
substantial role. 172 While it is tempting-albeit risky-to predict the future,
as disclaimed in the introduction this paper's undertaking is more limited,
i.e., to set out the factors the authors believe will guide and determine that
future. We will, however, use Dr. Emanuel's event horizon of 2025, just 10
years from now. A decade seems a short time; but, in these rapidly
changing times, even that period exposes predictions to a myriad of factors
that could have profound effects on our society, its economy, and the
political landscape. While we cannot begin to control for all of the
variables, 17 we will sidestep two linchpin unknowns
by assuming that the
174
ACA and the employer mandate both stay in place.
A.

Employers' Options

Employers have essentially three options for dealing with their situation
under the ACA as it currently stands. First, they can simply comply with the
law and provide their FTE employees (and their employees' dependents
under age twenty-six, not including spouses) with insurance that meets the
ACA's minimum requirements. For employers not currently providing
insurance, this will be a significant change. For those already providing
coverage, compliance may entail increases in premiums since new policies
meeting the ACA's minimum standards may have richer, more durable
benefits and, thus, may be more expensive than the lesser coverage many

Coverage, NEWSMAX (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.Newsmax.com/Newsfront/Emanuelemployers-drop-health/2014/03/21/id/560906/#ixzz3J34ktkdb: see also Jim Angle: If
Obaniacare StayAs, Enqloyer Based Insurance Will Go, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Sept. 1,
2014),http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2014/09/01/angle-if-obamacare-stays-emplo

yer based insurance will go.html (reacting to Dr. Emanuel's prediction). (Dr. Emanuel, a
University Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, is a colleague of Professor Rosoff in
The Wharton School's Health Care Management Department, and is also Chair of Penn's
Department of Medical Ethics and Health Policy and the University 's Vice Provost for
Global Initiatives).
172. See Hyman & Hall, supra notes 16 and 94-100and accompanying text.
173. Donald Rumsfeld might well caution that in addition to the known unknowns in
this situation we also have to factor in the unknown unknowns! David A. Graham,
Rumsfeld 's Knoins and Unknoins: The IntellectualHistorY of a Quip, THE ATLANTIC (Mar.
27. 2014). http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/03/rumsfelds-knowns-andunknowns-the-intellectual-history-of-a-quip/3 59719/ CBut there are also unknown
unknowns-the ones we don't know we don't know.").
174. Although. as discussed supra in Section III.C... the Supreme Court's recent
landmark decision for the government in King I'. Burwell gives strong assurance that the law
will remain in force, there are numerous proposals for modifications and improvements.
including several that would eliminate or change the employer mandate. See. e.g.. note 124
and accompanying text.
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companies had before. 17 In both cases, employers will have to decide how
much additional cost they will bear themselves and how much they will
pass on to their employees, either in the form of higher employee premium
contributions or lower wages. This decision, of course, is affected by all of
the factors that normally influence employer-employee negotiations
concerning wages and other terms and conditions of employment. 176
Second, an employer can choose to not provide coverage, or to provide
coverage that does not meet ACA standards and pay the ESR penalty,
which, simply put, is $2,000 per year for each uncovered employee, except
for those exempted. 177 A variant of this approach would be to provide ACAcompliant coverage to some FTE employees but not to others. The
downside to this approach is that an employer must pay a $3,000 ESR fee
annually for each employee who buys coverage on an exchange and
qualifies for a federal (tax credit) subsidy. 17 Since only lower-income
employees are eligible for a subsidy, this provides a strong deterrent against
an employer continuing to provide good coverage for its executives and
higher-paid workers while skimping on coverage for its lower-paid

workers. 179

175.
Changes in the healthcare system brought about by the ACA may reduce the costs
of care and thus insurance premiums-hence the aspirational and optimistically named Patient
Protection andAffordable Care Act. Early indications, which may be misleading because of
the other possible causative factors, are that the ACA has slowed the rise in costs. David
Cutler, The Health-CareLat 's Success StorY: Slowing Doun Medical Costs, WASH. POST
(Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-health-care-laws-successstory-slowing-down-medical-costs/2013/11/08/e08cc52a-47c1-11 e3-b6f8-3782ff6cb769_
story.html. It will likely take some time, however, before the cost-saving benefits of the Act,
including price competition enabled by the exchanges, are realized. In the meantime,
premiums may rise.
176.
See generally Questions and Answers, supra note 126. Moreover, the choice is not
entirely up to the employer, since the ACA's Employer Shared Responsibility (CESR")fee
provisions put affordability requirements on the insurance coverage. If the employee's cost
is too high relative to his or her income, or the employer doesn't contribute a sufficient
percentage to the premium cost, the employer must pay the ESR penalty.
177
The applicable exemptions are discussed in note 135, supra and the accompanying
text.
178.
Vladimir Shuliga, Emnployer SharedResponsibility, OTTOSEN-BRITZ (Oct. 3,
2013), http://www.obkcg.com/article.asp?a=721. Note that the employer is responsible only
for the lesser of (a) the $2,000 penalty for not providing health insurance or (b) the $3,000
penalty for providing insurance that fails in some way to meet the federal standards for
minimal essential coverage and for affordability.
179.
As long as the employer meets the minimum standards set by the ACA for its
lower-paid workers it can provide richer benefits to its higher-paid workers. Starting in 2018,
though, employers who provide benefits higher than the maximum level set by the ACA will
be subject to the so-called "Cadillac tax." See 26 U.S.C. § 49801 (West, Westlaw through
P.L. 113-296 (excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-287, and 113-291) approved Dec. 19, 2014)
(describing the "Cadillac tax"): Cadillac Tax Fact Sheet, CIGNA 1 (Jan. 2015), http://
www.cigna.com/assets/docs/about-cigna/informed-on-reform/cadillac-tax-fact-sheet.pdf
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Third, an employer could opt to set up a "private exchange" and arrange
for its employees to get coverage through this mechanism. In many
respects, this is a half-step between the first two options, one that employers
are starting to explore, in large part because insurance brokers and HR
consultants are starting to market and aggressively promote private
exchange packages. 8 0 Private exchanges offer some significant advantages.
Most importantly, employees receiving their coverage through a private
exchange can, if their purchase options are set up properly, continue to get
the tax shelter for the premium contribution by the employer and also for
any contribution the employee makes through a payroll deduction
arrangement.' 8 ' On the other hand, employees getting coverage on a private
exchange cannot receive federal tax subsidies as they can on public
exchanges. 18' Since a tax shelter benefits higher-paid employees more than
lower-paid employees, and the tax-credit subsidy on the public exchange is
available only to lower-income employees, 183 it is easy to see why higherpaid employees might favor the private exchange approach more than
lower-paid employees. Thus the composition of the employer's wvorkforce
and the "voice" (i.e., influence) that each segment of that workforce has
within the company can substantially affect the employer's decision to use a
private exchange. Another important factor in that decision is the cost to
maintain a private exchange, which is mostly the fee paid to the entity
chosen to administer the exchange. 8 4 Obviously, the calculations necessary

(explaining basic facts about the Cadillac tax).
180.
See Akshay Kapur et aL, The Emergence of PrivateHealth Insurance Exchanges:
FIuelingthe "Consumerization " ofEmplover-SponsoredHealth Insurance,Booz & Co. 1, 4-

5 (2012), http://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/file/Strategyand-Emergence-PrivateHealth-Insurance-Exchanges.pdf.
181.

See Nancy Duta and Christopher Calvert, Thinking of Joining a Private Health

InsuranceExchange? Look Before you Lecqt, 21(1) PERSPECTrVES 2 (Sibson Consulting,
2013), available cit http://www.sibson.com/publications/perspectives/volume 21 issuel/
pdfs/printall.pdf (last visited 6/2/2015). See also Emanuel, suipra note 173, at location 5494
of 7285 (Kindle reference).
182.

See Health Care Reform: What is a Health Insurance Exchange, AETNA, http://

www.aetna.com/health-reform-connection/reform-explained/video-exchanges.html (last

visited June 22, 2015) ("The Affordable Care Act provides tax credits and subsidies ...
when [individuals] shop on a public exchange."). See also Duta and Calvert, supra note 181,
at 2 ("***employees purchasing coverage on a private Exchange will not receive the
premium assistance subsidies for low-income employees. This difference between the
private and public Exchanges can be extremely significant for individuals in lower-paid
jobs.")

183.

See Duta and Calvert, stupra note 181, at 2 (discussing how subsidies are available

to qualifying individuals who do not have access to affordable insurance). See also

discussion at supra note 168. In absolute dollars a tax shelter is more valuable to higher-paid
employees who are in a higher income tax bracket. However, in relative terms the tax benefit
may be less critical to a wealthier employee's ability to afford health insurance.
184.

See Health Care Reform: Private Exchanges Considered, GATEWAY FIN. (June
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to decide what is best for a particular employer and its employees, class by
class, are very complex. An important service HR consultants and
promoters of private exchanges provide is helping employers think through
these pros and cons and make the decision.l'one factor that may favor
private exchanges in some instances is that an employer may be able to use
key HR staff already in its organization to help set up and administer the
private exchange. Preserving the in-house HR function and staff positions
may have strong appeal to some executives who are well positioned to
influence top management's decision on howy to handle health benefits.
Therefore, private exchanges may play a significant role in the future of the
ACA.
B. How Will Employers Decide?
A complex of factors will affect how employers choose among the above
three approaches and their variants. Many of these factors predate the
passage of the ACA. Employers previously had to decide, for example,
whether to provide health insurance to their employees, how generous that
insurance should be, how best to provide it, 8 6 and whether all employees
would be treated the same.' 87 All of these decisions reflect a broader set of
factors, which include, inter alia: corporate philosophy,'
the labor
market, 8 9 and the composition of the employer's xxorkforce.' 90 To all of the

2014), http://www.gatewayfinancial.biz/sites/all/files/gatewayfin/Health-CareReformPrivateExchangesConsidered_06-20-14.pdf (explaining how a private exchange can
reduce operational costs).
185.
TransformningHow Etnployers Provide, Fund and Manage Health Benefits,
TOWERS WATSON 1-2 (2014), https://www.towerswatson.com/DownloadMedia.aspx?media=
%7B3ECBC33E-F9CD-4906-B9E3-29FBDIBA7AED%7D.

186. For example, whether to offer a single health plan or a "cafeteria" plan with
various options from which employees can choose. See Hyman & Hall, supra note 16, at 2527.
187. Employers commonly treat part-time employees differently from full-time
employees in terms of health insurance and other fringe benefits. Beyond this, some
employers have different health insurance benefits for certain classes of full-timers, e.g.,
upper management, as compared with rank-and-file workers. See Health Coverage if You
Work Part-Tine,HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/have-job-based-coverage/
part-time-workers/.
188. E.g., how the owners/managers of the firm feel about their obligations to their
employees. Small Emnployer Health Insurance Survey, EHEALTH 5 (Mar. 2013), http://
news.ehealthinsurance.com/_ir/68/20132/eHealth%20Spring%202013%2OSmall%2OBus%2
OSurvey.pdf.
189. E.g., how hard the firm has to compete with other companies to recruit and retain

employees and what its competitors are doing with regard to health insurance. See id.
190. This includes a myriad of factors such as: how many different classes of workers
the company employs, the number of people in each class, the wage distribution among the
employees, whether the company is unionized, the health-risk characteristics of the various
employee classes, which bears on the cost of providing coverage, and the level of healthcare
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above factors affecting employers' decisions regarding health insurance are
added the following elements introduced, either directly or indirectly, by
the ACA. These include:
1. The employer mandate: This is a huge factor that directly impacts the
decision whether to provide, or continue to provide, employee health
benefits. The ACA-imposed ESR fees, while they may not be large enough
in many cases to absolutely dictate what the employer must do, are an
enormous consideration, as they were intended to be.
2. The individual mandate: While a firm's employees surely cared before
the ACA whether the employer provided health insurance, they will care
more noxw that they are subject to the Act's individual mandate and xill
have to pay a penalty if they are not covered.
3. Other options for employees to get coverage: The ACA's patient
protection provisions and the insurance exchanges now make it possible for
people who previously could not get coverage other than through an
employer's group insurance-or could not get it at an affordable price-to
get it on their own. Moreover, low-income employees purchasing insurance
on the exchanges may be eligible for federal subsidies that are more
beneficial to them than the tax shelter they would enjoy if they got
employer-provided insurance.' 9 For them, the employer's decision to not
provide coverage and to compensate by raising wages could be a plus,
provided wvages are increased enough to cover the employee's cost of
purchasing insurance on an ACA exchange. Further, if an employee's
income level is low enough and his or her state has opted to expand its
Medicaid eligibility, coverage options may be available that previously
were not.
4. The attractiveness of choice: Employees who may previously have been
happy enough to have their employer choose coverage for them, often on a
"one size fits all" basis, may be attracted to the exchanges, which are

costs in the various geographic area(s) in which the company operates. See Health Care
Reform May Change the Cost and Conposition of the Part-Time Workforce, ADP RESEARCH
INST., http://www.adp.com/tools-and-resources/adp-research-institute/insights/insight-itemdetail.aspx?id=C2ECCF4C-C999-45BB-B20E-DA4FE3C4579A (last visited Mar. 20,
2015).
191.
Rick Curtis & Ed Neuschler, Affordable Accessfor Modest-Income Workers
Eligiblefor Groiqp Coverage, HEALTH AFF. (Aug. 18, 2009), http://m.healthaffairs.orgiblog/
2009/08/18/affordable-access-for-modest-income-workers-eligibe-for-group-coverage/. To
review the tax implications for lower-paid employees, see the discussion at note 183, supra,
and accompanying text.
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essentially retail websites where they can make their own choices. As
Hyman and Hall point out,19 - employer provision of insurance helps some
employees by choosing for them among a confusing myriad of options.
However, some employees, for a variety of reasons, might be better off, or
perceive themselves to be, if they were free to choose for themselves in a
more open market.
5. Public acceptance of the exchanges: After a rocky start in the fall of
2013, Healthcare.gov and the state exchanges are doing well. 193
Enrollments are exceeding expectations and TV ads, billboards, and
consumer-assistance organizations are generally painting a rosy picture of
the available choices. 194 This is not just hype; many who have purchased
insurance on the exchanges are very pleased with the process and with the
coverage they now have. 195 Presumably, the word will spread and

192.
Hyman & Hall, supra note 16, at 30.
193.
Elise Hu,HealthCare.gov IsNow Working Smoothly, White House SayAs, NPR
(Dec 1,2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/12/01/248049882/healthcaregovs-capacity-is-stable-at-its-intended-level. See Obamacare Facts, State Health Insurance
Exchange: State Ritm Exchanges, http://obamacarefacts.com/state-health-insuranceexchange/ (last visited July 1,2015). See State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2015,
http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-health-insurance-marketplace-types/ (last
visited June 3,2015). Obviously, the Supreme Court's recent decision in King I.Burwell
may affect states' decisions about whether to set up their own exchange or, for states that
have already done so, to continue to operate the exchange. With federal subsidies now held
to be available on federal exchanges, a state's motivation to operate its own exchange is
diminished. See, e.g. Margot Sanger-Katz, Obamacare Ruling May Have Just Killed StateBased Exchanges, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2015), availableat http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/06/26/upshot/obamacare-ruling-may-have-just-killed-state-based-exchanges.htmI
?_r-0. See also Lena H. Sun and Niraj Chokshi, Alhnost HaIfof ObamacareExchanges
Face FinancialStruggles in the fitttre, WASH. POST (May 1,2015), availableat http://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/almost-half-of-obamacare-exchanges-arestruggling-over-their-future/2015/05/01/f32eeea2-eaO3-1 1e4-aael-d642717d8afa-story.html.
194.
Igor Volsky, 6 Reasons Why ObamacareEnrollnent IsGoing Better Thani You
Think, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 12, 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/11/12/
292393 1/obamacare-enrollment-going-better-think/ (describing how enrollment has
exceeded expectations). Some commentators have observed, however, that enrollment
projections were revised downward by the Obama Administration after the initial epic fail of
the Healthcare.gov roll-out. See Chrysler Summer, Has ObamacareBeen A Success Or A
Failure?OPPOSINGVWEWS, Dec. 10, 2014, available at http://www.opposingviews.com/i/
columns/has-obamacare-been-success-or-failure (downloaded 6/3/2015). See also Bruce
Japsen, Ad Spending on ObamacareMay Make Don DraperBhtsh, FORBES (May 11, 2013,
8:31 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2013/05/11/ad-spending-on-obamacaremay-make-don-draper-blush/ (describing the types of advertising used in the campaign): Sun
and Chokshi, supra note 193.
195.
Joan McCarter, ObamacareEnrollees Overwhelningly Approve of Qualily and
Affordabilit " of their New Istsurance, DAILY KoS (Nov. 14, 2014, 12:01 PM), http://
www.dailykos.com/story/2014/11/14/1344969/-Obamacare-enrollees-overwhelmingapprove-of-quality-and-affordability-of-their-new-nbsp-insurance (discussing how
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employees who might previously have been discomforted by the possibility
that their employers would stop providing coverage may now be much
more accepting of, and perhaps even desire, that change.
6. Differential advantage: As with all change, there will be winners and
losers; the question in a particular company may not be "which approach is
better," but rather, "which is better for whom?" Moreover, the perception of
who gains and who loses may not match the reality, and the angst over the
possibility of losing is a factor in itself. An employer who discontinues
coverage or sets up a private exchange may benefit one class of its
employees while disadvantaging others. Employers who make a choice
about whether and how to comply with the ACA without carefully
assessing their employees' likely reaction may be shooting themselves in
the foot. And, as noted above, some employees who are impacted, or who
perceive themselves to be impacted by the change, may be better positioned
than others to make their voices heard and responded to by their

employer. 196
7. Compensation equity: Closely related to the preceding point, some
employees who lose employer-provided health coverage may be given, or
be able to get, higher wages to make them whole, or perhaps even improve
their position. This adjustment of compensation may come more or less
automatically and immediately or it may come about only after a period of
employer-employee tension and negotiation; and, as noted above, it may
come about for some parts of an employer's labor force and not for others
8. Diplomacy: How an employer goes about deciding what to do about
health insurance and how it involves its employees in the decision process
- i.e. making clear that it is taking their interests and feelings into account
- may matter as much as the substance of the decision.
9. What other employers do: In all situations, there are leaders and
followers. As Dr. Emanuel points out in his predictions, 197 there will be
industry leaders who will take action and point the direction others will
followv. It's impossible to foresee howv this factor wvill play out and howv it
wvill affect emplovers' actions.

customers are satisfied with their coverage).

196. For example, managerial class employees may be able to "push back" against an
employer's decision to stop providing health insurance while rank-and-file workers in the
same company have no recourse but to accept it.
197. See Emanuel, supra note 171 at 317-318.
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10. How the world turns: From the start, the ACA has been, and continues
to be, enormously controversial. Much of the controversy has to do with the
substance of the law itself and its implications, but a great deal has also
been political football. Republicans, aided in no small measure by Fox
News, have worked hard to convince the public that Obamacare is a
travesty, an insidious encroachment upon American principles and its
citizens' freedoms, and a constitutional violation that was crammed down
the public's throat without its understanding or approval. 198 Even some
supporters of the law, such as MIT professor Jonathan Gruber, have added
to that perception. 199 As a result, some five years after the passage of the
ACA, with millions more people covered than before, acceptance of the law
is still widely variable, in part because it is only dimly understood .
Happily, there are signs that the ACA's popularity has continued to grow
and its supporters are now in the majority; 201 but the game is not over. What
employers will do and how employees, and the public in general, react will
certainly be influenced by the broader political landscape. With the 2016
national elections coming up fast, that landscape will be the scene of some
brightly lit struggles. The fate of the Affordable Care Act will undoubtedly
be affected by all of this and by how the many components of the ACA
prove to work. Will healthcare costs go up, down, or stay the same? Will
the availability of health services and the quality of care improve or
decline? Such questions abound, but the point is clear: the future is
uncertain and many U.S. employers will wait to see how things shake out
before deciding whether and how much to change their approach to health
care and to EBHI.
The above is not an exhaustive list of factors affecting how employers
will handle their health insurance decisions and, more broadly, the
implementation and ultimate fate of the ACA; but it highlights the main and

198. Mark NC, Is Fox News the Most FlaccidPropaganda Tool Ever?, NEWS CORPSE
(Oct. 12, 2013, 3:09 PM), http://www.newscorpse.com/ncWP/?p=10698.
199. Kate Pickert, The Truth About Gruber-Gate, TIME (Nov. 13, 2014), http://
time.com/3583526/the-truth-about-gruber-gate/ (discussing how Jonathan Gruber called the

American people "stupid" and said "a lack of transparency" was crucial to getting the ACA
passed): see John Cassidy, The Real Lessons of "Gruber-Gate," THE NEW

YORKER (Nov.

18, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/real-lessons-gruber-gate CGruber
says that the creators of the A.C.A. deliberately misrepresented, or kept vague, some of its

contents, seeking to exploit the 'stupidity' of ordinary voters.").
200. See Steve Liesman, TtIat's zn a Aame 2" Lots Tlien It Comes to ObaniacareAC,
CNBC (Sep. 26, 2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101064954 (showing that more Americans
say that they favor the "Affordable Care Act" than those who like "Obamacare," even
though they're the same exact law).
201.

See Caitlin Owens, Poll: Just as Many Americans Like Obamacare as Dislike It,

(Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.nationaljournal.com/health-care/poll-moreamericans-like-obamacare-than-dislike-it-2015042 1.
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most obvious ones. Moreover, it shows that the calculations each employer
makes and the conclusions it reaches on the subject may be somewhat
different. The authors hope this analysis and exposition will make those
calculations easier and the conclusions reached more likely to be the right
ones.
V.

CONCLUSION: WHAT WLL THE FUTURE BRING?

This paper has tracked the evolution of employment-based health
insurance in the U.S. from its earliest days to the present and attempts to
project its path into the future. This final section draws these evolutionary
steps together into a conceptual framework to help readers evaluate and
project for themselves what the future will bring.
To properly understand our pluralistic, disjointed healthcare system, one
has to recognize that, unlike other major nations that have had UHC for
many years, the U.S. system did not grow as a coordinated governmentdirected program. Rather, it evolved over roughly a century through a
countless number of independent choices. o Our system is in many
respects a "non-system." but just because it's uncoordinated and disjointed.
one cannot assume it's easy to change. It is held together bv an extensive
and intricate web of private arrangements, decisions, relationships, and
economic interactions. Because these links were independently developed
and put in place at different times, they are harder to dismantle and replace
with something new - and that's even without considering the myriad of
political barriers that would have to be surmounted to accomplish major
systemic change. The Gordian knot nature of things has made healthcare
reform an exceedingly difficult task, one that has taken such a long time and
is still far from being achieved.
The ACA, by strengthening the health insurance marketplace and
requiring insurers to make adequate coverage available to all on a more
affordable and non-discriminatory basis, has largely undercut the rationale
and necessity for EBHI. Nevertheless, the ACA hasn't simply done away
with employment-based coverage, because it couldn't. Our healthcare
system is resistant to change because it has evolved in a way very much in
svnc with "the American way" of doing things. As a people we value
choice; we don't want anyone telling us what to do-and, for a large

202.
Note, though, that government actions - such as the passage of Medicare,
Medicaid, the HMO Act, ERISA, the Internal Revenue Code provisions granting favored
treatment to employer provision of health benefits and, of course, the ACA - very much
created the context and opportunity for many free market developments. For an excellent
analysis of this interplay between government actions and private initiatives, see ROBERT I.
FIELD, MOTHER OF INVENTION: How THE GOVERNMENT CREATED "FREE-MARKET" HEALTH
CARE (Oxford U. Press, 2014).
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segment of our population at least-especially not wvhen it's the
government doing the telling. Our healthcare system is full of choice,
choice that often adds cost and confusion without providing any meaningful
advantage but that the public holds dear anyway.
Tied in with this choice structure, the pluralistic, free enterprise nature of
the system is now reinforced by a broad and deep network of providers and
payers who have a stake, or believe they do, in preserving the stattus quo.
These stakeholders have substantial economic power and political clout;
their perspectives, desires and fears must be considered when any change is
contemplated. Compounding this point, our national commitment to the
status quo in health care matters is reinforced by a broader societal
suspicion of change. We are loath to let go of what we have unless we
know, or at least are fairly sure, that what will replace it will be better.
Unfortunately, with so many separate elements, forces and imponderables
in our system, no one can assure that the ACA's path to healthcare reform
will play out well enough to satisfy all, or nearly all, of the U.S. public. It is
painfully obvious that many believe the ACA is a disaster and will destroy,
or at least greatly damage, a system that is one of the best in the world.0 3
The foundational concept of the ACA, one that makes it uniquely
American and consistent with our national history and expectations, is that
it is not highly prescriptive. It leaves much room for free choice and
operates largely by incentives and disincentives rather than by rigid rules. A
key example of this flexibility is that the employer and individual mandates
are not full mandates; the penalties for non-compliance are not so severe
that compliance is the only option. This latitude for free choice, more than
any other aspect, makes it difficult to predict what the future will bring.
Under the ACA, the future will be what countless parties decide to make it.
Insurers can decide, within limits, what their health plan offerings will
include and what they will cost. Employers can decide what they want to do
regarding the provision or non-provision of insurance and the adjustment of
compensation packages to adapt to their coverage decisions. Employees can
accept what their employers offer them or push back in an attempt to affect
employer actions. If they push back, they may be more or less successful.
The quality and cost of health care may rise, fall, or stay relatively
unchanged because of the ACA's innovations and requirements and
providers' reactions to them. Moreover, people's perceptions of howy the
ACA is working will differ depending on their personal situation and may

203.
Whether the U.S. healthcare system really is one of the best in the world depends
on whom you ask and what criteria are used to evaluate it. Clearly on many well-established
measures - e.g., longevity, infant mortality, percent of the population with reliable access to
good quality care, etc. - our system does not rate so well. See Orlando (2013), suJpra note 78,
at 68-69.
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be accurate or misinformed. Finally, the national and global economy,
evolving demographics, any further legal challenges,
and political
developments, most notably the run-up to the 2016 elections, will all bear
heavily on how the other factors outlined above play out.
Like Ezekiel Emanuel, we believe that Employment-based Health
Insurance is an anachronism and is on its way out. For well over half a
century, it has served our nation fairly well and has largely satisfied
employers and employees (and their dependents). Its main failing has been
the large number of Americans who were unable to get good coverage
reliably under that regime. The ACA addresses that in two ways: first, by
having the employer "mandate" and, second, by establishing exchanges
where people can bypass the EBHI system and still get satisfactory
insurance coverage. Now employers can choose, with some pressure but no
coercion, to play or not play, and their employees are not in danger of being
shut out of coverage if the employer chooses not to play. They have a viable
alternative. For these reasons, the path taken in the future will be
determined by a complex interplay of employers and employees, each side
making its own choice as to what best serves its interest and then trying to
get the other to go along wvith that choice. It wxill be a complex "negotiation"
and it may well play out differently in different sections of the country, in
different industry sectors, in different companies within the same industry,
in different socioeconomic strata, and so on.
Although we see things going in the direction that Dr. Emanuel predicts,
unlike him, xe're not prepared to put a time limit on our projection. The
myriad operative factors intertwine and the forces propelling them all can,
and most likely will, move at different speeds. Suffice to say we think
employment-based health insurance has pretty much run its useful life
course. It's time for a change, and the ACA has laid a good foundation to
promote and facilitate that change.
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